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BLANK CHECKS: RESTORING THE BALANCE
OF POWERS IN THE POST-CHEVRON ERAt
SANFORD N. CAUST-ELLENBOGEN*
INTRODUCTION
Our Constitution is a deceptively simple document. Article I
grants all legislative powers to Congress,' article II vests executive
power in the President, 2
 and article III vests the judicial power of
the United States in the Supreme Court and in inferior courts
established in conformance with that articles Despite this scheme
of government, often referred to as the separation of powers, there
is considerable overlap in functions among the branches of govern-
ment.4
 These overlaps give rise to a system of checks and balances
that prevents any one branch from exceeding the proper limits of
its powers. or from exercising its powers improperly. 5
Overlaps in functions among the three branches of government
arise frequently. For example, the judicial branch "legislates" when
it engages in common-law makings and in statutory interpreta-
t Copyright © 1991 Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen.
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A., State
University of New York at Albany, 1974; M.C.R.P., Harvard University, 1977; ID., New
York University, 1985. Daniel Chow, Arthur Greenbaum, Camille Hebert, Lawrence Herman
and Michael Kindred provided many useful comments and suggestions that improved this
article. Michael Gardiner and Joseph Mulligan provided excellent research assistance.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
2 Id. art. II, 3 I, cll.
3 Id. art. III, § 1. The main attribute of courts established pursuant to article III is that
their judges enjoy lifetime tenure with non-diminishing salary. See id.
In his article, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, Sunstein states:
[The notion of separation of powers is in important respects a mischaracteri-
zation of the constitutional system, which should instead be understood in terms
of checks and balances. The three branches of course have overlapping func-
tions; each is involved to some degree in the activities of the other. The term
"separation" tends to disguise this fact.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 430 (1987); see also
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsis-
tency?, 72 CORNELL L. Ray. 488, 492 (1987) (each branch serves as the ultimate authority for
a particular function).
5 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-84 (1989); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 721-27 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, l22 (1976).
6
 There are numerous areas of federal common law. Admiralty is perhaps the least
controversial and most longstanding area. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Op-
erating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959). Other areas of federal common law include
controversies between states, see, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
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tion. 7 The judiciary necessarily executes and enforces the law when
it adjudicates claims and determines remedies. 8
The executive branch engages in legislation and adjudication
through the actions of administrative agencies. Federal legislation
often delegates responsibility to administrative agencies to imple-
ment statutory schemes. These statutory schemes often contain am-
biguities or gaps that the implementing agency must clarify or fill.
Sometimes, the statutory scheme sets forth broad policy goals to
which the agency must give meaning as it implements the scheme.°
In all of these contexts, the agency is legislating.° Agency duties
sometimes encompass the power to adjudicate the rights and obli-
gations of private parties under a federal statutory scheme." In all
of these situations, the executive branch exercises the kind of power
ordinarily wielded by another branch of government.
Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938), and where application of federal common law is necessary to
vindicate uniquely federal interests. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 427 (1964) (foreign relations); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366
(1943) (federally-issued securities). Sometimes, an area of federal common law is implied in
order to assure the effectiveness of a federal statutory scheme. See, e.g., Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (federal common law deemed necessary
to govern suits under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947).
7 Although statutory interpretation is often idealized as merely divining congressional
intent, the line between law-finding and law-making is a fine one, at best. Finding the law
involves an interpretive act to which a judge brings a number of interpretive tools to bear
on the text, such as canons of statutory construction and legislative history. Although there
is considerable debate over the proper interpretive tools to use to give meaning to legislative
texts, there is little dispute that the content of a legal rule is unclear until and unless the text
is subjected to interpretation. Thus, judges are an essential partner in the process of law-
making. Even if it could be said that the meaning of legislative texts exist independent of
their interpretation by judges, issues often arise that the text does not address. In these
situations, judges are called upon to fill in "gaps" left by the text. Although this process is
sometimes couched in terms of divining congressional intent, it is a hypothetically constructed
intent. It is a search for what the enacting Congress would have written into the legislative
text had it decided to do so. In other words, the court is fashioning a legal rule where none
exists. This is law-making.
" For example, the antitrust laws are enforced in three different ways: private causes of
action, criminal prosecutions and FTC adjudications. In the course of adjudicating private
causes of action, courts are the primary enforcers of the statute. In the other modes, the
courts share enforcement with the executive branch and the FTC, respectively. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 4, 8, 15, 45 (1988).
9 See Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 372-
85 (1989).
'° See infra text accompanying notes 183-99 for a discussion of the nondelegation
doctrine, setting forth the limits on congressional power to delegate law-making power to
administrative agencies.
" See infra text accompanying notes 238-83 for a discussion of the limits of Congress's
ability to reassign judicial authority to administrative agencies.
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The legislative branch has not succeeded in wielding executive
or judicial powers directly.' 2 It has succeeded, however, in vesting
executive power in administrative agencies that are not directly
accountable to the President.I 3 Although the constitutional authority
for this "fourth branch" of government is far from clear, it is none-
theless an established feature of the modern administrative state."
This article addresses one area of overlap in the functioning of
the branches of government, namely, the power of administrative
agencies to make determinations of law. It explores the extent to
which the judiciary, in reviewing administrative determinations of
law, should function as a check against administrative action. This
article critically examines the argument, made most forcefully in
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council," that courts must
defer to reasonable interpretations of law made by administrative
agencies, and it rejects that argument on constitutional and non-
constitutional grounds. Further, this article posits that Chevron rep-
resents a usurpation of judicial power and results in excessive con-
centration of power in administrative agencies.
Given the overlap of powers inherent in the constitutional
structure, the branches of government must develop rules concern-
ing the recognition and supremacy of the actions taken by each
branch. 16
 Rules regarding the appropriate scope of judicial review
12 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-34 (1986) (congressionally-controlled
official may not execute the law); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983) (Congress
may not overturn executive action without engaging in the legislative process).
' 3
 1 refer, of course, to so-called independent agencies such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), and the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), that are composed of Commissioners whom the Presi-
dent may not remove from office, except for cause. The validity of independent agencies
was established in Humphrey's Executer v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) and
recently reaffirmed in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-93 (1988).
" See generally Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 Coi.uin. L. REV. 573 (1984) (arguing that all agencies, both executive and
independent, should be viewed as within a fourth branch of government). Others find a
significant distinction between the two types of agencies. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291,
46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (imposing certain regulatory procedures and requirements on
executive, but not independent, agencies); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-92 (1952)
( Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing for different standards of judicial review of independent
agencies than for executive agencies).
15
 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See Kramer, The Constitution as Architecture: A Charette, 65 IND. L.J. 283, 287-88 (1990)
(the overlap of power does not mean that the branches are of equal status when exercising
particular functions); Strauss, supra note 4, at 492 (each branch serves as the ultimate
authority for a particular function).
Without such rules, disagreements among the branches would spin citizens through a
never-ending loop in which Congress legislates, the President (or an agency) acts in accor-
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of agency action remain unresolved and controversial. Although
courts often appear to defer to an agency's construction of its or-
dance with his (or its) understanding of the law, this action is challenged in court, the court
acts in accordance with its understanding of the law, Congress amends the statute to restore
its understanding of the act, etc. Of course, it is possible (and likely) that, in many, if not
most instances, the branches will agree, thus avoiding an infinite loop. 1 also do not mean to
suggest that the branches would not act in good faith in discharging their duties.
For example, in service of these rules, the Supreme Court has decided, apparently
without much dissent from the other branches, that it is the final authority on the meaning
of the Constitution. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 681 703-07 (1974); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (Court
interpretation of Constitution supreme to that of state legislature); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. I, 4 (1958) (Court interpretation of Constitution supt erne to that of state officials). But
see Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tut.. L. REN, 979, 983-89 (1986) (Supreme Court
decisions are not binding on future actions of other branches of government). Having set
forth that axiom, the Court was then able to set forth rules on supremacy. Some of the rules
the Court has developed are uncontroversial. For example, it is now clear that courts must
interpret all statutes in a way that furthers clear congressional intent. There is considerable
debate within the Court, as well as among the legal community generally, as to the proper
methods of statutory interpretation. See generally W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION
569-828 (1987); Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes
in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U.L. REV. 277 (1990). Most
methods of statutory interpretation, however, result in the enforcement of clear congressional
directives provided that such directives are not irrational or unconstitutional.
In addition, other branches must respect congressional attempts to alter statutory inter-
pretations if Congress modifies the statute through constitutional procedures and if the
content of the new legislation is constitutional. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59
(1983). As to nonconstitutional matters, the legislative branch's pronouncements are superior
to those of other branches. As Madison put it "In republican government the legislative
authority necessarily predominates." THE FEDERALIST No. 50 at 356 ( J. Madison) (B. Wright
ed. 1961). Other rules are less clear and more controversial. This article is concerned with
what one such rule should be, namely, what posture courts should take in reviewing admin-
istrative determinations of law. This is not untread ground. More than forty years have
passed since the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111
(1944), and Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), and the enactment of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 1-12, 60 Stat. 237-44 (1946)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 551-706 (1988)). The APA judicial review provision requires
the reviewing court to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action." 5 U.S.C. 706.
It has been over ten years since the introduction of the Bumpers Amendment, which
cleared the Senate in 1982, but was not enacted by the House of Representatives. See S. 1080,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S2717 (1982). Earlier versions have existed since 1979.
The thrust of the Bumpers Amendment was to make clear that courts reviewing agency
actions should "independently decide all relevant questions of law." Id. See generally O'Reilly,
Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U.
CIN. L. REV. 739 (1980).
More than five years have passed since the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 67 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron is widely regarded as the
most important decision in this area, and one of the most important decisions in all of
administrative law. See Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE Li. 511, 512.
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ganic statute, courts sometimes decide questions of law indepen-
dently.' 7
 Even when courts defer to administrative determinations,
courts' descriptions of deference vary widely.' 8
 Nonetheless, it ap-
pears that two fundamentally different concepts of deference have
developed. 19
 One concept of deference requires courts to defer to
agency interpretations only to the extent that courts find them
persuasive." The Chevron opinion articulates another definition of
deference.
According to Chevron, in the absence of congressional intent to
the contrary, courts should defer to reasonable agency constructions
of their organic statutes, even if a court would reach a different
construction if it had to address the question de novo. 2 ' Adherents
of this "strong reading" 22 of Chevron view it as vindicating congres-
sional intent to delegate policy-making to administrative agencies.
They also find the strong reading to be consistent with a philosophy
that policy decisions should be made by governmental actors who
are politically accountable.
This article contends that the strong reading of Chevron should
be rejected because it is unconstitutional, represents poor political
theory, produces bad policy outcomes, and rests on shaky doctrinal
foundations. 23 Chevron is based on two questionable premises: first,
" Compare Hearst, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (Court defers to NLRB construction of term
"employee"), with Packard, 330 U.S. 485, 490 (Court construes the term "employee" inde-
pendently of NLRB).
19 See Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 AD.
L. REV. 329, 333 (1979).
19 See Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
559-67 (1985); Monaghan, Mario); and the Administrative State, 83 Comm. L. REV. I, 7-14
(1983).
22 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
See, e.g., Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 An. L. REV. 363, 373
(1986).
22
 There is more than one way to read Chevron. The strong reading is one that requires
courts to defer to agency interpretations of law in most situations. Such a reading also
interprets the term deference in its strong sense—to require courts to defer to agency
interpretations they do not agree with but that are, nonetheless, reasonable. See generally
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 AD. L. REV, 353, 367-71 (1987)
[hereinafter Judicial Review) (comment of Cass R. Sunstein).
I do not mean to imply that other readings of Chevron are illegitimate. 1 focus on the
strong reading of Chevron because it is the most widely accepted interpretation of the case.
See, e.g., Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts? 7 YALE J.
REC. 1, 16-42 (1990); Breyer, supra note 21, at 373; Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative
Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 AD. L.J. 255, 255-86 (1988);
Pierce, Chevron and Its'Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions,
41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 303 (1988). It also sets forth a vision of judicial review most at odds
with the one I ultimately propose.
22 See also Breyer, supra note 21, at 373 ("To read Chevron as laying down a blanket rule
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that one can distinguish between those situations in which courts
are interpreting legislative texts from ones in which they are ex-
trapolating from legislative texts; 24 and second, that Congress in-
tends the agency and not the courts to extrapolate from the text. 25
The distinction between law interpretation and extrapolation is elu-
sive at best, and does not form a sensible or stable line on which to
demarcate judicial and agency roles. Moreover, there are few rea-
sons to believe that Congress intends to allocate judicial and agency
authority along this line.
Even if we assume that Congress intends to draw the line
suggested in Chevron, this article contends that such an action by
Congress would be unconstitutional. Interestingly, the question of
the constitutionality of requiring the federal courts to defer to
agency constructions of law has received scant attention in the ad-
ministrative law literature. 26 Yet it is axiomatic that all legislative
enactments are legitimate only if they are constitutional.27 When
one analyzes the constitutional limits on the scope of judicial review
of agency action, one reaches the conclusion that Congress may not
restrict the scope of review of agency action without violating prin-
ciples of separation of powers.
This conclusion gives one pause—how can it be unconstitutional
for courts to defer to agency action given the line of cases from
NLRB v. Hearst Publications to Chevron that appear to require defer-
ence? The answer to this conundrum is that, although it would be
unconstitutional for Congress to limit the scope of judicial review of
agency action, it would not violate the Constitution for courts, as a
prudential matter, to give deference to at least some agency deter-
. . . would be seriously overbroad, counterproductive and sometimes senseless."); id. at 381
("If taken literally, the Court's language suggests a greater abdication of judicial responsibility
to interpret the law than seems wise, from either a jurisprudential or an administrative
perspective.").
24 See, e.g., Diver, supra note 19, at 574-92. But see Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in
Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1,22 (1985) (making such a claim). See Pierce, supra note 22,
at 308 (distinguishing between "real" and "creative" statutory interpretation).
22 See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 22, at 4; Levin, supra note 24, at 4. But, as Dean Diver
has pointed out: "The trouble with this line of argument is that few statutes are addressed
exclusively to an agency. Unless Congress intended to exclude judicial review, one must
presume that the courts are also among its intended audience." Diver, supra note 19, at 576.
26 The federal courts literature has given tangential treatment to the subject. See, e.g.,
Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. Ray. 915,
976-86 (1988); Strauss, Article III Courts and the Constitutional Structure, 65 IND. L.J. 307,309
(1990).
27 See Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Juris-
diction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 37 (1981).
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minations." This type of deference, radically different from the
type of deference urged by adherents of the strong reading of
Chevron, is consistent with prior case law and is preferable to the
strong reading of Chevron as a matter of policy."
Section 1 of this article summarizes the major pre-Chevron po-
sitions towards deference to administrative determinations of law."
The section then discusses Chevrons' and the post-Chevron United
States Supreme Court cases and examines how the Supreme Court
has applied and shaped the deference doctrine since Chevron.32
Section 11 identifies and analyzes the coherence of the deference
doctrine." This section first explores the constitutional legitimacy
of the strong reading of Chevron and concludes that the strong
reading is unconstitutional because the deferential posture of review
upsets the balance of power among the branches of government. 54
Section II criticizes the argument that the strong reading of Chevron
represents an attractive theory of government." Finally, this section
unearths some cases in which courts did not follow Chevron and
" See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("The weight of (an
administrator's) judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.").
" Prudential deference is different from Chevron's notion of deference in two respects.
First, it is not a blanket rule of deference. The trigger for prudential deference varies
according to the type of decision and specific context at issue, thereby requiring a case-by-
case determination. Nonetheless, one can identify general situations appropriate for defer-
ence. The flexibility inherent in a case-by-case analysis is desirable precisely because it allows
the court to take into account different interests and considerations at stake in particular
cases. In short, a case-by-case analysis need not be an ad hoc approach.
Second, the degree of prudential deference varies from situation to situation. The strong
reading of Chevron generates a hard form of deference—a court must defer to a reasonable
interpretation even if the court does not believe it to be the best interpretation. In contrast,
prudential deference entails persuasive deference, that is, an agency's interpretation might
influence a court's conclusion as to the best interpretation. Depending upon the issue, a court
would assign the agency's interpretation greater or less weight. Prudential deference does
not suffer from constitutional infirmity because the courts always retain full authority to
interpret the law; they are not required to acquiesce to the administrative agency's deter-
minations. This reservation of power serves as an effective check on administrative action
even if, in practice, the court does not always exercise this power. The threat of declining to
defer results in agencies acting more responsibly and, if the agency does not act responsibly,
the courts retain the power to correct agency action.
30 See infra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
3t See infra notes 71-99 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 100-59 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 174-301 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 302-14 and accompanying text.
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suggests a more general set of concerns that ultimately undermine
the rationale of Chevron.36
Section III dismisses the strong reading of Chevron as an un-
acceptable model for judicial review and considers two alternative
visions of the court/agency relationship. 37 This section first discusses
a managerial model but concludes that it is unsatisfactory, because
it creates too blunt an instrument to accommodate adequately the
complex set of issues raised by the court/agency relationship." Al-
ternatively, the article proposes a model of interbranch coopera-
tion. 39 Under this case-by-case approach, the courts choose to accord
certain types of agency decisions varying amounts of persuasive
deference. This section suggests some of the factors that should
influence the courts' decisions to grant deference in particular cases.
Finally, this section considers some likely objections to this inter-
branch cooperative approach, concluding that, despite objections,
it is the best approach."
1. THE DEFERENCE DEBATE
A. The Pre-Chevron Cases
The pre-Chevron. cases are notable for their apparent inconsis-
tency regarding judicial review of agency interpretations of law.`" ---
Two cases that review decisions of the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") typify two conflicting approaches to judicial de-
ference to agency decisions. 42 In 1944, in NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that a court ought
3" See infra notes 315-34 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 340-95 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 342-52 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 353-70 and accompanying text.
4° See infra notes 371-95 and accompanying text.
41 As judge Friendly observed:
We think it is time to recognize ... that there are two lines of Supreme Court
decisions ... which are analytically in conflict .... Leading cases support[ I the
view that great deference must be given to the decisions of an administrative
agency applying a statute to the facts However, there is an impressive body
of law sanctioning free substitution of judicial for administrative judgment when
the question involves the meaning of a statutory term.
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 1 7.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd sub noon.
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977). The post-Chevron cases
suffer from many of' the same consistency problems. See infra notes 100-59 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of these cases.
42 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,
330 U.S. 485 (1947).
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to defer to the NLRB's interpretation of the term "employee" under
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 43 The issue in Hearst
was whether "newsboys" were "employees" for purposes of the
NLRA. The NLRB concluded that the NLRA's definition of em-
ployee was broad enough to encompass what it described as a "hy-
brid" employment situation because the policies and purposes un-
derlying the NLRA were best effectuated by interpreting the
definition broadly."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the
NLRB's analysis, 45 deciding that the NLRA contemplated the use
of common-law standards in determining the definition of em-
ployee. Because the relationship between the newsboys and news-
papers best fit into an independent contractor relationship, the
circuit court held that the newsboys were not employees for pur-
poses of the NLRA. 46 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Ninth Circuit. 47 After noting that Congress had not defined the
term "employee" explicitly, the Court concluded that the judiciary
should defer to the NLRB's interpretation. 48
The Hearst Court did not adequately substantiate why a court
should defer to an agency on an issue of law. Portions of the opinion
appear to characterize the NLRB's determination as involving "ul-
timate conclusions," "inferences of fact" and "specific applications
of a broad statutory term," rather than a legal interpretation. 49
 The
' 3 322 U.S. at 130-31.
44 Id. at 131-32. Following Hearst, Congress amended the NLRA definition of employee
to alter the rule of law made in the Hearst case, making it clear that the definition of employee
excluded independent contractors. See NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256
(1968); Aurora Packing Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 73, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Congress, in 1947,
rejected the reasoning in Hearst Publications and directed that 'employee' specifically exclude
'any individual having the status of an independent contractor.'").
45 136 F.2d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 1943).
44 Id. at 614.
47 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 120 (1944).
4' Id. at 130-31.
49 Id. Regardless of semantic niceties, the NLRB decided that newsboys were employees
under the NLRA. It did so, not because the relationship between the newsboys and the
newspaper satisfied some agreed upon standard; to do so would be an example of the NLRB
arriving at ultimate conclusions, making inferences of fact and making a specific application
of a broad statutory term. Instead, the NLRB defined the statutory term "employee," albeit
in the course of deciding that newsboys qualified as employees. This definition was a deter-
mination of law. See Monaghan, supra note 19, at 29 ("Administrative application of law is
administrative formulation of law whenever it involves elaboration of the statutory norm.").
It is true that the NLRB arrived at the definition implicitly, and, after Hearst, it remained
somewhat unclear what exactly an employee was for purposes of the NLRA. That is not to
say, however, that the implicit definition had no import in future situations. The process of
adjudication results in a stare decisis effect which, as more cases are decided, results in a
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k
opinion also contains some language tending to point to the NLRB's
expertise in labor relations as a reason for deferring to its deter-
minations. 5° Additional language indicates that courts should defer
to the NLRB because Congress had delegated the implementation
of the statutory scheme to the NLRB." The Court devoted most of
its attention to explaining the need for a federal standard and spent
little time explaining why the agency rather than the courts should
set this standard. 52
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court appeared to reverse
its course entirely in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB. 53 In Packard,
the Court held that it should not defer to the NLRB's interpretation
of the term "employee" under the NLRA.54 The issue in Packard
was identical to the issue in Hearst, namely, who is an employee for
purposes of the NLRA. The Packard Court's approach could not
have been more different than it had been in Hearst. It distinguished
"naked" questions of law, such as whether a foreman can be an
employee, which are to be determined without deference to the
NLRB, from other issues that might be vested in an agency's dis-
cretion."
more explicit crystallization of the legal rule. Although more explicit definitions, as in for
example, a rulemaking, provide more guidance as to what the legal norms are, it is generally
permissible for an agency to develop legal norms using adjudication. See NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03
(1947). See generally Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
5° 322 U.S. at 130-31.
51 See id. Justice Roberts, in dissent, posed the alternative position clearly and concisely:
Congress did not delegate to the National Labor Relations Board the function
of defining the relationship of employment so as to promote what the Board
understood to be the underlying purpose of the statute. The question who is
an employee, so as to make the statute applicable to him, is a question of the
meaning of the Act and, therefore, is a judicial and not an administrative
question.
Id. at 135-36 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
57 In other areas of federal law, however, federal courts have developed a federal
common law based upon state law principles. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (federal common law of labor law). Decisions arising
under the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction constitute another major example. See gen-
erally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE Law OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 1975).
53 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
54 Id. at 488-90.
55 The Packard Court stated that:
Whatever special questions there are in determining the appropriate bargaining
unit for foremen are for the Board, and the history of the issue in the Board
shows the difficulty of the problem committed to its discretion. We are not at
liberty to be governed by those policy considerations[, however,] in deciding the
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Courts and commentators have attempted to reconcile Hearst
and Packard. 56 Three approaches have emerged; none of them is
entirely satisfactory. One approach, flowing almost directly out of
the Hearst opinion, is a distinction between law declaration and law
application." Law declaration involves the formulation of a general
interpretation of law divorced from a particular context. Law ap-
plication, on the other hand, is more interstitial in character. The
Hearst Court arguably viewed the issue at stake as one of law appli-
cation, whereas Packard was a situation of law declaration. 58
Quite aside from the logical paradox of finding that the same
legal question of defining an employee could be an example of both
law declaration and law application, this distinction raises three
concerns. First, it would appear to define all rulemaking as law
declaration, because rulemaking is the making of general statements
divorced from specific factual contexts." This categorization would
be anomalous because it is in precisely those situations of rulemak-
ing that agencies are regarded as acting in a legislative capacity,
and, according to many commentators, should thus be reviewed
most deferentially. 6° Second, this distinction conceives of law decla-
ration and law application as discrete categories, when, in fact, few
determinations are made divorced from factual contexts, and few
applications of law lack ramifications for other situations.
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, even if one could main-
tain a coherent distinction between law declaration and law appli-
cation, there is no jurisprudential theory that justifies courts treating
law declaration differently than law application. One could advance
naked question of law whether the Board is now, in this case, acting within the
terms of the statute.
Id. at 492-93. The Packard Court did not cite or distinguish Hearst in its opinion.
59 See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 558-64 (1965); Byse,
supra note 22, at 265-66; Levin, supra note 24, at 24.
51 See Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Coup& L. REV. 229, 235-36 (1985).
Professor Byse has attempted to show that there were elements of law declaration and law
application in Hearst itself, and that the Court employed different standards in analyzing
agency action of each sort. See Byse, supra note 22, at 265-66.
59 See also Judicial Review, supra note 22, at 368 (comment by Cass Sunstein distinguishing
between "pure" and "mixed" questions of law).
59 This assertion might be somewhat overbroad. Some forms of rulemaking, particularly
rate setting, are specific to a situation. Perhaps it would be more accurate to restrict the
observation to "informal" rulemaking conducted in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 553.
This is because agencies engaged in rulemaking are performing a legislative, rather
than judicial, function. Accordingly, courts might treat such agency pronouncements as if
issued from legislatures. Further, because such agency action does not represent a direct
assumption of judicial power, independent review might not be required by article 111. See
infra notes 284-301 and accompanying text.
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two theories to justify the distinction. First, under a comparative
expertise theory, courts would have a comparative advantage in law
declaration because that is, after all, their basic business. In matters
of law application, however, the agency has an advantage because
its experience and technical expertise in its regulatory area helps it
to apply a legal rule to the facts of a particular situation. Nonethe-
less, one might question why, if courts are expert in law declaration
because they can better identify a sound general principle or better
divine congressional intent, they are not equally expert at applying
specific rules. Conversely, if agency expertise is useful in specific
applications of the law, why would this expertise not be equally
valuable in developing general rules, where knowledge of the entire
regulatory agenda and environment may be crucial to the assess-
ment of the wisdom of pursuing various policies? The comparative
expertise theory also inverts traditional conceptions of judicial ex-
pertise and power. Judicial power is typically considered to be the
application of legal concepts to particular situations. As the factual
context of cases become more abstract, concerns are raised as to
whether the courts are overstepping their obligation to decide only
cases and controversies before them. 61
A second theory f9r reconciling Hearst and Packard focuses on
the efficient utilization of court resources. In this managerial model,
courts use agencies to leverage courts' capacity to decide cases.
Courts defer to agencies in law application situations because rela-
tively little is at stake—the effect of the agency action is limited to
the parties involved in the specific action. In situations with broader
impact, the court makes its own determination of law so as to
provide accurate guidance to similarly situated potential litigants.
For example, in Hearst, the reach of the determination was limited
to newsboys. 62 On the other hand, in Packard, the potential reach
of the decision was larger--to all foremen in industry.
This managerial model does have some precedent in other
areas of judicial review, such as appellate review of trial courts. For
example, rulings of law made by trial courts are often subject to
abuse of discretion review by courts of appeals. 63 This analogy is
61 In the extreme, the judicial attempt to set general principles might be conceived of
as merely dictum. The concept of dictum transforms attempts by the courts to make decla-
rations of law into examples of the application of principles of law to specific factual contexts.
62 Congress, however, which interpreted Hearst as setting a rule of law affecting the
difference between employees and independent contractors, altered the Hearst result through
legislation. See supra note 44. One should therefore be cautious about drawing lines based
upon the impact of a decision.
63 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257-61 (1981) (forum non conveniens);
FED. R. Co/. P. 11, 14, 15, 19, 37, 41, 52, 59, 60, 61.
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inexact, however, and the differences between the two situations
raise significant concerns. In the appellate review situation, litigants
are assured that all legal determinations are made by a competent
court. In contrast, deferential judicial review of agency action may
deprive a litigant of having a legal issue determined by a court.
This result raises constitutional concerns."
A third way of reconciling Hearst and Packard is to focus on
congressional intent. Congress might have intended that courts de-
fer to agency interpretations of law of some, but not all, issues. Even
accepting this premise, however, judicial review provisions tend not
to distinguish court posture based on the type of agency decision. 65
Any congressional intent must be inferred, and no basis seems to
exist for any inference of congressional intent. 66 In addition, even
if courts consider congressional intent, deference to agency decla-
rations of law raises the issue of whether Congress can constitution-
ally allocate power between courts and agencies on this basis. Sur-
prisingly, this issue has not received serious attention in the
administrative law literature.°
61 See infra notes 200-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of these concerns.
65 Packard and Hearst both involved the same provision, namely, section 2(2) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988). See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 113-20
(1944); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 486-88 (1947). The APA makes
some distinctions based on the mode of agency action, but, again, this does not aid in making
the kind of distinction sought to be drawn here. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
66 See Scalia, supra note 16, at 516 (arguing that there is no clear congressional intent,
but that it is sensible to presume intent to defer).
" See supra note 26. See infra notes 174-301 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the problem. Commentators have suggested that, unlike Hearst, Packard required a reconcil-
iation between two statutory provisions, therefore justifying different treatment of the legal
issue by the courts.
In particular, commentators argue that Packard required a reconciliation between the
terms "employee" and "employer" because foremen could logically be considered either. See
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988) ("The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of
an employer, directly or indirectly . . ."). This argument is weak for two reasons. First, as
the Packard Court noted, the statutory conflict theory is a weak argument at best. See Packard,
330 U.S. at 488-89. Having dismissed this argument, the Court would appear to have no
reason not to apply Hearst deference to the NLRB determination.
Second, even assuming the existence of a statutory conflict, why would such a situation
not be appropriate for deference? To the extent that reconciliation of the provisions repre-
sents a balancing and prioritization of competing legislative goals, a pro-deference position
should argue in favor of deference with greater force in such situations. See Chevron U.S.A.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) ("the Administrator's inter-
pretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is
entitled to deference").
Even granting this difference between Packard and Hearst, its relevance is unclear. At
best, such a difference suggests that a more complicated legal problem is involved. It does
not suggest, however, who should solve that problem.
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In sum, after Hearst and Packard, the rules concerning judicial
deference to agency determinations were uncertain. Courts had
developed no clear guidelines to indicate which situations required
deference. Further, when courts deferred to agencies, it was unclear
whether the agency was entitled to binding, or merely persuasive,
deference. Hearst implied that a court should defer to an agency
interpretation even if it differed from the conclusion that the court
might reach de novo. 68 Yet, in other cases, the Court took a much
weaker deference posture. 69 Against this history of confusion, the
Court set to work in Chevron to make a clear path for courts to
follow.
B. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council held that a court should defer to
an agency's reasonable construction of its organic statute, even if a
court would reach a different construction if it had addressed the
question de novo.70 Chevron entailed a petition for review of a rule-
making conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 7 '
These amendments imposed certain requirements on states that
had not achieved specified air quality standards. Such states had to
establish permit programs that imposed stringent conditions before
allowing the construction of "new or modified major stationary
sources" of air pollution. 72 Under the EPA regulations, an entire
68 "Th[e] task [of determining who is an employee] has been assigned primarily to the
agency created by Congress to administer the Act .. . „ Resolving that question ... 'belongs
to the usual administrative routine' of the Board." Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130 (quoting Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941)) (footnote omitted).
69 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1949). The Skidmore Court took a
much weaker deference position:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their au-
thority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case Will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.
Id. at 140.
70 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 172(b)(6), 91 Stat. 685
(1977) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 7502(b)(6) (1988)).
72
 42 U.S.C. It 7502(b)(6) (1988).
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"industrial grouping" could be considered to be a "stationary
source.
1173
This definition of stationary source was at issue in the petition
for review. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had set aside
the regulations. 74 The court had determined that, although there
were no clear indications of congressional intent with regard to the
meaning of stationary source in the text or legislative history of the
amended act, the EPA's definition would not further "the purposes
of the nonattainment program." 75
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stevens, writing for a
unanimous Court, 76 faulted the lower court for having made a "basic
legal error" 77 by "misconceiv[ing} the nature of its role in reviewing
the regulations at issue." 78 He then set forth a two-step test for
judicial review of agency action on matters of law. 79 First, a court
75 The regulations for the Clean Air Act state:
(i) "Stationary source" means any building, structure, facility, or installation
which emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act.
(ii) "Building, structure, facility, or installation" means all of the pollutant-
emitting activities which belong to the same industrial grouping, are located on
one or more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the control of
the same person (or persons under common control) except the activities of
any vessel.
40 C.F.R.	 51.18 (j)(1)(i), (ii) (1985).
The construction of a new source of air pollution in an existing industrial grouping
would not be considered to be a new stationary source under the regulatory scheme. Instead,
a plant .could install a new or modified source of air pollution without meeting the permit
conditions if the alteration would not increase the plant's total emissions. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 840. The EPA's approach thus placed a "bubble" over the entire industrial grouping
and, instead of regulating with respect to each individual source of air pollution, it measured
total emissions from the bubble. See id.
54 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
75 Id. at 726 n.39.
75 Justices Marshall, Rehnquist and O'Connor did not participate in the decision.
" Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
75 Id, at 845.
79 Justice Stevens described the two-step test as follows:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it adminis-
ters, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative inter-
pretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
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must give effect to Congress's clear and unambiguous intent ex-
pressed in• a statute. Second, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, a
court must defer to any reasonable agency construction of the stat-
ute. 8° Thus, in applying this two-part test, the Chevron Court upheld
the regulations• because Congress had not addressed the precise
issue in question, and because the Court determined that the EPA's
construction of the statute was "a reasonable policy choice for the
agency to make." 81
The Court's justification for the test was almost as important
as the test itself. Justice Stevens noted that if an agency is acting
pursuant to an explicit delegation of authority by Congress, courts
should give agency interpretations "controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute," 82
Even when congressional delegation to the agency is implicit, "a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency."83
88 Id.
81 Id. at 845.
82 Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).
83 Id. (footnote omitted). The Chevron Court's reason for deference lies in comparative
competence and political theory:
[T]he Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of
manifestly competing interests .... Congress intended to accommodate [these]
interests but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these
cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the
balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to
do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps
Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and
those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by
the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing
political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences.
In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking respon-
sibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incum-
bent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agen-
cies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such
policy choices . . .
. The responsibility for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not
judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political
branches."
Id. at 865-66 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
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Justice Stevens' opinion is striking for the breadth of its argu-
ment. First, he rejects any distinction between agency action arising
from express and implied delegation. 84 Further, the Court appears
not to have considered a third category of agency action, namely,
action in which there is no congressional intent, express or implied,
to delegate a matter to the agency to resolve. Instead, the Court
indicated that courts should apply a blanket rule of deference to
agency decisions.
Second, Justice Stevens offers three rationales to support this
blanket rule of deference. One rationale is congressional intent—a
delegation by Congress to an agency implies a reservoir of discretion
granted to the agency that the courts must respect. A second ra-
tionale lies in comparative competence. Because agencies are expert
in their areas of delegated power (and courts are not), courts should
defer to reasonable determinations made by those agencies.
Stevens' last rationale, however, is particularly striking. He dis-
tinguishes courts, that may not make decisions on the basis of "per-
sonal policy preferences" 85 and that "have no constituency,"86 from
Congress and agencies, which may make political choices. 87 Thus,
courts should uphold an agency action not only if it represents an
exercise of technical expertise but, alternatively, as an exercise of
political prerogatives by the Chief Executive."
The first two of Justice Stevens' rationales are familiar views of
administrative law. With respect to congressional intent, courts have
long permitted Congress to delegate certain matters to administra-
tive agencies. Under traditional doctrine, however, agency actions
must be consistent with an "intelligible principle" that is set forth
in the legislation and capable of judicial review." Justice Stevens
84 Id. at 843-44. A close reading of Stevens' opinion indicates that there might be a
difference in judicial posture depending on the source of the delegation to the agency.
According to Stevens, courts should give "controlling weight" to agency action taken pursuant
to an express delegation "unless [the agency action is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute." Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). Courts should uphold action taken
pursuant to implied delegation if "reasonable." Id. These two standards, whatever their
differences, both appear to require a court to defer to an agency interpretation of law that
the court would not adopt de novo.
n Id. at 865.
'6 Id. at 866.
87 Id. at 865-66.
'' Id. This dichotomy is said to be of constitutional dimension. The Chevron Court noted
that "'[o]ur Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.'" Id. at 866
(quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
89
 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (delegation
must be specific enough to ensure that "fundamental policy decisions" are made by Congress
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acknowledges the possibility that Congress could decide not to de-
cide an issue and instead pass the question to the agency. 9° This
abdication upsets the balance created by the Supreme Court in its
nondelegation doctrine. 9 ' It is one thing for Congress to set policy
at an abstract level and delegate specific implementation to the
agency. It is quite another thing for Congress to delegate policy-
setting to the agency. If Justice Stevens was suggesting that Congress
could give the agency a "blank check," he would be altering, if not
eviscerating, the nondelegation doctrine. Congress must provide
for judicial review with a meaningful standard to assess agency
action for conformance with law. 92
Justice Stevens' second rationale for deference, agency exper-
tise, makes some sense, given a congressional delegation accom-
panied by discernible standards. Indeed, on the facts of Chevron,
the EPA appeared to utilize its admitted expertise to resolve the
issue in a detailed and reasoned fashion.° But, deference based on
expertise implies a different sort of deference than one based on
the mere fact that an agency makes the determination. The exper-
tise implicated involves how best to regulate in order to achieve
given ends. It assumes that the ends are discernible and set by
Congress and does not imply deference to set policy ends. Once the
issue is shifted to one of means, expertise is reflected primarily in
and that reviewing courts have "some measure against which to judge the official action that
has been challenged"). In Yakus v. United States, the Court noted:
[T]he only concern of courts is to ascertain whether the will of Congress has
been obeyed. This depends ... upon the determination whether the definition
sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it
may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative
will.
321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944); see also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
909 (1928) ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
9" Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
91
 Although courts have questioned the continued vitality of the nondelegation doctrine,
the Supreme Court, including Justice Stevens, believes that it has a continuing role in
administrative law. In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448
U.S. 607 (1980) (the "Benzene" case), Justice Stevens construed a statute to impose certain
restrictions on agency action in order to avoid finding it violative of the nondelegation
doctrine. American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 659-62. Interestingly, Stevens did not appear to
accord much deference to the agency, nor did he cite the Benzene case in his Chevion opinion.
Professor Pierce, who has noted the linkage between Chevron and the nondelegation doctrine,
asserts that the Chevron and Benzene cases are inconsistent. See Pierce, supra note 22, at 311—
12.
92 See infra notes 178-199 and accompanying text for a discussion of this standard.
99 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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the assessment of the likely outcomes of policy alternatives. Such
assessments should be entitled to deference, at least to the extent
that they represent factual conclusions."
For example, consider two factual variations of Chevron. In the
first variant, the EPA recognizes that its mission is to reduce air
pollution while allowing reasonable economic growth to continue. 95
The EPA then concludes either that the bubble concept would
maximize reductions in air pollution96 or that the economic benefits
to be obtained by employing the bubble concept would outweigh
the expected societal benefits in terms of reduced air pollution to
be obtained by not employing a plant-wide bubble. 97 In the second
variant, the EPA indicates that it cannot serve its mission of reducing
pollution and allowing economic growth at the same time. Given
these two inconsistent goals, it chooses a rule that serves only one
of the two goals.
In the first variant, the EPA used its expertise to arrive at its
conclusion but in the second variant, it did not. To the extent that
the EPA acted in accordance with the first variant, the D.C. Circuit
was wrong to void the regulations, assuming that the EPA engaged
in a reasoned analysis of the options and the data. 98 But, if the EPA
acted in accordance with the second variant, its conclusion was not
94 Justice Scalia, however, has argued that agency expertise provides a strong argument
for persuasive deference, but not for the kind of binding deference implied in Chevron. See
Scalia, supra note 16, at 514.
95 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851 (discussing legislative history of the 1977 Amendments
to the Clean Air Act).
" This is a plausible conclusion. The bubble concept provided incentives for plants to
modernize, Without a bubble definition, it might be ''simpler and cheaper to operate old,
more polluting sources than to trade up . ." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863 n.36; see also id. at
n.37.
97 Experts often assess policy alternatives by comparing the benefits of a policy choice
with its costs. See E. MISHAN, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS (1972). The use of benefit'
cost analysis is controversial in certain contexts. In particular, to the extent that congressional
policies are unambiguously phrased in a way that makes benefit/cost analysis inappropriate,
it may not be used. For example, in independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole, the
court struck down a regulation permitting maritime shippers involved in international trade
to enter domestic shipping. 809 F.2d 847,852-54 (D.C. Cir,), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 ( 1987).
The court nullified the regulation because the agency considered factors, such as economic ,
efficiency, that were not part of the clear policies underlying the statutory scheme, while the
agency gave little consideration to other policies that, though inefficient, were unambiguously
expressed by Congress. Id. In the case of the Clean Air Act, the proposed benefit/cost analysis
is more defensible because the Clean Air Act contemplates a tradeoff between pollution
reduction and economic growth. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851.
99 See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co., 463 U.S. 29,40-44 (1983) (courts should take a hard look to ensure that the
agency has rationally considered all issues).
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entitled to deference, at least if one employed the expertise ration-
ale.
Justice Stevens' third rationale—that the Constitution requires
courts to defer to the policy choices of the political branches—is the
rationale that breaks new ground in administrative law. If Justice
Stevens intended that, in the face of statutory ambiguity, courts
ought to defer to interpretations of law made by other branches of
government, he has turned the principle of judicial review inside
out. Heretofore, it had been assumed that the courts were the final
arbiters of statutory meaning."
Chevron thus redefined the terms of the judicial review debate.
It appeared to resolve the inconsistency in approach suggested by
Hearst and Packard with a unitary two-part test applicable to all
questions involving judicial review of agency determinations of law.
Chevron also articulated forcefully a set of rationales supporting
deference to agencies.
This article now critically examines both of these aspects of
Chevron. First, it evaluates whether Chevron's two-part test has
proven to be a coherent, easy-to-apply test in practice. The post-
Chevron Supreme Court cases suggest that Chevron's test has not
been applied consistently in later cases. The article then critically
examines and questions the rationales supporting Chevron.
C. The Post-Chevron Debate in the United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has struggled to divine the scope and
meaning of Chevron. The very sweep of Justice Stevens's opinion
has thrust it into the foreground of administrative law, and has
caused litigants to raise Chevron arguments in a variety of contexts.
The results have been surprising. The Court has retained the an-
alytical structure of Chevron but, rather than serving as a unifying
force, the two-step approach of Chevron appears to have been ma-
nipulated to achieve particular results in each case. The Packard)
See Farina, Statutory Interpretation and•the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
Comm. L. REV. 452, 460 (1989) ("Chevron's language so narrowly circumscribed the judicial
function in statutory interpretation that it was difficult, at first, to believe Justice Stevens'
opinion could be taken literally."). Professor Monaghan, writing before the decision in Chev-
ron, argues that deference in the face of statutory ambiguity only makes sense if one assumes
that uncertainty creates a zone of delegated power within which the agency acts. Thus,
Monaghan would require an affirmative showing of congressional intent to delegate power
to the agency. See Monaghan, supra note 19, at 30. Monaghan does not explain, however,
why congressional intent should be immune from judicial scrutiny. See infra notes 193-97
and accompanying text.
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Hearst pre-Chevron debate appears to have been supplanted by a
debate among the Justices as to whether a particular legal issue falls
either within the first step of Chevron—where Congress has ad-
dressed the precise issue in question—which, like Packard, would
not entail deference to the agency; or the second step of Chevron—
where Congress has not addressed the precise issue in question—
which, like Hearst, requires courts to defer to the agency.
In 1986, in Board of Governors, Federal Reserve „System v. Dimension
Financial Corp., the United States Supreme Court held that the
Federal Reserve Board ("Fed") exceeded its regulatory authority
when it attempted to extend its reach over financial institutions to
encompass certain "non-bank banks" that offer services similar to
those of traditional commercial banks.m The Fed enacted a •regu-
lation defining a "bank" as any institution that accepts deposits that
"as a matter of practice" are payable on ,demand. 1°' The Fed in-
tended this regulation to reach institutions offering negotiable or-
der of withdrawal .("NOW") accounts as alternatives to traditional
checking accounts offered by commercial ,banks.'°2 The Fed argued
that, Although' depositors in NOW accounts did not technically have
a right to be paid on demand by the institution, the practice of
institutions offering such accounts was to pay depositors on de-
mand. Thus, the "legal right to withdraw on demand" language,
although not literally met, was met in practice. Meanwhile, because
of the overlap in function between the banks and the non-bank
banks, it was important for the Fed to regulate these non-bank
banks.
The Court viewed the case as a Chevron step-one situation:
Congress expressly limited the applicable statute to regulation of
institutions that accept deposits that "the depositor has a legal right
to withdraw on demand."° 3 The Dimension Financial Court did not
'°° 474 U.S. 361, 363 (1986).
j° ' The applicable statute defined "bank" as any institution "which . . . accepts „deposits
that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1988).
'°' NOW accounts function like ordinary checking accounts, permitting depositors to
write checks to third parties, but, unlike ordinary checking accounts, NOW accounts pay
interest on deposits and the institution retains the right to impose a waiting period before
honoring requests to withdraw funds. See Dimension Financial, 474 U.S. at 367.
I " Dimension Financial, 474 U.S. at 368. The Court noted:
[n]o amount of agency expertise—however sound may be the result—an make
the words "legal right" mean a right to do something "as a matter of practice."
A legal right to withdraw on demand means just that: a right to withdraw
deposits without prior notice or limitation. Institutions offering NOW accounts
do not give the depositor a legal right to withdraw on demand; rather, the
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consider it relevant that when Congress arrived at its definition of
a bank, NOW accounts were not in widespread use. In addition,
the Court did not examine Congress's purpose in arriving at its
particular definition or what effects the Court's ruling might
have. 104 Thus, even though it is doubtful that Congress intended
by its language to address the precise issue in question, in adopting
the plain meaning of the statute, the Court assumed that Congress
had addressed that issue. The Dimension Financial Court declined
to look beyond the plain meaning of the statute, even when con-
fronted with plausible reasons for doing so.
In 1986, in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,
however, the United States Supreme Court deferred to an agency
interpretation contrary to both the plain language of the statute
and legislative history. 105 At issue was whether the Secretary of
Commerce was required to find that, when Japan refused to abide
by whaling quotas set by the International Whaling Commission, it
was "diminish[ing] the effectiveness of an international fishery con-
servation program." 106 The Court concluded that, despite the seem-
ingly clear language of the statute, the statute did not preclude the
Secretary from considering other factors in the course of making
his certification decision.'"
The Japan Whaling Court's reasoning presents an odd appli-
cation of the first step of Chevron. The Secretary's argument was
not that Japan's actions did not "diminish the effectiveness" of the
treaty, 1 °8 but that the statute did not preclude the Secretary from
creating exceptions to the certification requirement. In other words,
the Secretary argued that discretion not to certify should be implied,
absent statutory language that specifically prohibited the Secretary
institution itself retains the ultimate legal right to require advance notice of the
withdrawal. The Board's definition of "demand deposit," therefore, is not an
accurate or reasonable interpretation of § 2(c).
Id.
'" Indeed, the Court cited TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), for the proposition that
the Court should enforce anomalous, curious, and perhaps unwise legislation. See Dimension
Financial, 474 U.S. at 374 n.7.
05
 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
106
	 U.S.C. 1978(a)(1) (1988). If the Secretary made such a finding certain economic
sanctions against Japan would ensue. See 16 U.S.C. 1821(e)(2) (1988).
'07
	 U.S. at 232. In Japan Whaling, the Secretary concluded that, despite Japan's
harvesting of whales in excess of quota amounts, he was entitled to conclude under the facts
of the case that the conservation goals would be best served by prohibiting future whaling
by the Japanese without imposing present sanctions. Id.
108 See id. at 244 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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from examining surrounding factors in making a certification de-
cision.'°9
This presumption of discretion is not contained in the statutory
language, and it runs against the grain of legislative delegation
doctrine. The legislative power of the United States is vested in
Congress, and any power of the executive branch to make policy
choices must be delegated to it by the legislative branch. The ex-
ecutive branch's role in policy-making was initially limited to the
ascertainment of a fact or trigger event that would dictate known
consequences. 11° Although, over time, the doctrine was expanded
to permit an agency to "fill up the details""' of a statutory scheme
or even to permit Congress to delegate broad responsibility to an
agency to implement statutory objectives," 2 it has never been be-
lieved that Congress had to act to eliminate agency discretion specif-
ically. The statute in question can only be read to direct the Secre-
tary to engage in fact-finding that, once concluded, would trigger
specific agency action.
Similarly, it is difficult to see how the statute expressly or im-
pliedly delegates the question of whether the Secretary can consider
other factors in making its certification decision to the agency. Even
if the statute is so read, however, it is plain that the Secretary's
conclusion that the sanction Congress would have imposed on Japan
would be unwise frustrates congressional intent." 3 Thus, if Japan
Whaling is viewed as a Chevron step-two case, the Secretary's inter-
pretation of the statute is not reasonable.
Japan Whaling illustrates the problems that can result when the
courts do not take an active role in policing the balance of power
IN Id. at 232.
110 See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892) ("Legislative power was exercised
when Congress declared that the suspension should take effect upon a named contingency.
. (The President) was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and
declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect,"); Cargo of the Brig
Aurora v. U.S., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 386-88 (1812) (certain provisions of an act come
into effect after the President finds that certain facts exist).
"' United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (quoting Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)).
112 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1988) (Federal Trade Commission empowered to prevent
unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts or practices); id. § 78k (Securities and
Exchange Commission empowered to promulgate rules for the protection of investors); 29
U.S.C. § 160 (1988) (NLRB empowered to prevent unfair labor practices).
113 See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 245 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Secretary's manipulation of the certification process to affect
punishment is thus an attempt to evade the statutory sanctions rather than a genuine
judgment that the effectiveness of the quota has not been diminished.").
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between the executive and legislative branches. In Japan Whaling,
Congress clearly had reached a policy determination that fishing
treaties should be enforced." 4 The executive branch had not been
enforcing the provisions' as Congress had wished." 5
 An active ju-
diciary is needed to ensure legislative supremacy over the executive
branch on matters of policy." 6 When the judiciary blindly defers to
the executive branch, the legislative branch is weakened and our
constitutional structure is undermined. " 7
In 1986, in Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, the United
States Supreme Court strained to find statutory ambiguity to enable
it to reach step two of Chevron." 8 In Young, a Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") interpretation of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA")" 9 provided that when the presence of
a poisonous or deleterious substance in a food is required or cannot
be avoided, the FDA "shall prOmulgAe regulations limiting the
quantity [of such poisonous or deleterious substance] tO . guch extent
as [it] finds necessary for the proteCtiOri of public health." 129 When
the FDA declined to promulgate a section 346 regulation covering
aflatoxin,'" consumer groups brought Rai to compel agency ac-
tion.'"
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, applying Chevron,
concluded that Congress had addressed the precise issue in question
11 The International Whaling Commission had no power under the Convention to
enforce the fishing quotas. See id. at 224. Because of this lack of power, Congress legislated
the certification program. See id. at 225. After dissatisfaction with the original program, which
vested discretion in choice of sanction in the President, Congress amended the program to
impose a mandatory sanction. See id.
"5 See id. at 225-26 ("Congress grew impatient with the Executive's delay in making
certification decisions and refusal to impose sanctions.").
16 Interestingly, the political nature of this dispute was so pronounced that it was argued
that the political question doctrine precluded judicial review. See id. at 229-30. The Japan
Whaling Court rejected the argument, stating that "under the Constitution, one of the
Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility
merely because our decision may have significant political overtones." Id. at 230. The Court
then abdicated this responsibility, finding ambiguity where none existed and rubber stamping
executive action blatantly contrary to congressional intent.
' 17 See infra notes 174-301 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interrelation-
ship between court deference to agency decisions and separation of powers.
"5 476 U.S. 974,981 (1986).
19 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93' (1988).
l" Id. § 346.
1 ' 1 Aflatoxin is a carcinogen that is naturally and unavoidably present in some foods.
Young, 476 U.S. at 977-78.
192 The FDA argued that section 346 only required it to promulgate regulations "to
such extent as [it) finds necessary for the protection of public health" and, because it believed
that regulations were not necessary, the statute did not compel issuance. Id. at 979.
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and that section 346 required the FDA to promulgate the regulation
before foods containing aflatoxin could be sold in interstate com-
merce.'" The court interpreted the clause "to such extent as [it]
finds necessary for the protection of public health" as addressing
the quantity of aflatoxin to be allowed to remain in foods, not as
modifying the decision whether or not to regulate aflatoxin. 124 in
short, the court analyzed the case as an example of the operation
of step one of Chevron.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although Congress
may have attempted to address the precise issue in question, it had
not clearly done so.' 25 Even if the court of appeals' reading of the
statute may have been the more natural interpretation, the statute
could plausibly be read such that the phrase "to such extent as [it]
finds necessary for the protection of public health" modified the
word "shall." 126 The meaning of section 346 was thus deemed am-
biguous, and the FDA's interpretation was given deference under
step two of Chevron.
Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, viewed the interpretation of
statutes as a distinctively judicial role, requiring the exercise of
judgment.' 27 Moreover, the role of a judge also entailed some au-
tonomy, rather than blind deference to coordinate branches. Al-
though his opinion did not generate any concurrences, 128 Justice
125 757 F.2d 354, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
124 Id. at 357-58.
in Young, 476 U.S. at 980.
1" Id,
12' Justice Stevens stated that the Court was shirking its responsibility to interpret the
statute:
The task of interpreting a statute requires more than merely inventing an
ambiguity and invoking administrative deference . . . . [T]o say that the Com-
missioner's interpretation of the statute merits deference, as does the Court, is
not to say that the singularly judicial role of marking the boundaries of agency
choice is at an end. As Justice Frankfurter reminds us, "[t]he purpose of con-
struction being the ascertainment of meaning, every consideration brought to
bear for the solution of that problem must be devoted to that end alone." It is
not a "ritual to be observed by unimaginative adherence to well-worn profes-
sional phrases:" "Nor can canons of construction save us from the anguish of
judgment." The Court, correctly self-conscious of the limits of the judicial role,
employs a reasoning so formulaic that it trivializes the art of judging,
Id. at. 988 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 529, 544 (1947)).
Ise It is not apparent to me why Justice O'Connor's crabbed opinion was joined by the
other Justices, although I can understand why no other Justice joined Justice Stevens' opinion,
I can well imagine the Justices concluding that the FDA's position on regulation of potentially
harmful substances was reasonable. This creates a dilemma: should Congress's clear, but
unwise, statute control in the face of reasonable agency action to the contrary? Doctrinally,
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Stevens's approach was later supported by the Court in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca. 129
In 1987, in Cardoza-Fonseca, the United States Supreme Court
held that deference to an agency decision under section 208(a) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") was inappropriate.' 30
Under section 208(a) of the INA,' 3 ' deportable aliens are eligible
for asylum in the United States if they can demonstrate "a well-
founded fear of persecution [in their native country] on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion. . . ." I32 In addition, the Attorney General must
withhold deportation if the alien "would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion." 33
The Court had previously validated a "clear probability of per-
secution" test for the "would be threatened" provision. 134 The Im-
migration and Naturalization Service ("INS") argued that the sec-
tion 208(a) "well-founded fear of persecution" language should be
implemented using the same "clear probability of persecution" test.
In support of its position, the INS argued that, in the face of a gap
in the statutory scheme, Chevron required the courts to defer to its
reasonable construction of the statutory term.'"
the Court would have to conclude that congressional intent controlled unless it was irrational
or unconstitutional. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44
(1940). Section 346 was neither. Thus, the Court would have been forced to uphold what it
considered an unwise policy unless it could find congressional intent ambiguous. Deference
to the agency, in short, became a smoke screen to mask the Court's view of proper policy.
In addition, to require an agency to promulgate regulations raises separation of powers
issues with which the Court does not like to deal. In general, the Court has refused to
entertain suits compelling agency action. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985)
(decision by agency of whether or not to act is generally committed to an agency's absolute
discretion). Justice Stevens' interpretation of the use of the term "shall" in section 346,
however, would have removed the agency's discretion to act, rendering it reviewable. See
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). The Court in Bachowski stopped short of com-
pelling the agency to act, deciding that the Secretary would "proceed appropriately without
the coercion of a court order . . . ." Id. at 576. Given the opening left by Congress's poor
grammar, it is not surprising to find the Court willing to avoid the consequences of Justice
Stevens' position.
"5 480 U.S. 421 (1987). Professor Sunstein has called Cardoza-Fonseca "perhaps the most
sensible treatment of [judicial review of agency action] in the last two decades." See Sunstein,
On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 523
n.4.
1" 480 U.S. at 445-48.
8 U.S.C. I/ 1-1557 (1988).
1" Id. I 1101(a)(42), incorporated by reference into 4 208(a).
105 Id. 1 1253(h)(1).
'" See INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984).
100 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445 & n.29 (1987).
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Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the Court, disagreed
with the INS's Chevron argumerit. Because the Court was presented
with "a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to
decide," 36 he held that deference to the agency would be inappro-
priate. "Employing traditional tools of statutory construction,"'"
the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to employ the
same standard in section 208(a) asylum cases as in section 243(h)
deportation withholding cases.'"
Justice Scalia viewed Stevens's opinion as an attempt to limit
the more extreme reading of Chevron typified by cases such as Young.
According to Scalia, Stevens's opinion made deference "a doctrine
of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would oth-
erwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue."'" He termed
this view "an evisceration of Chevron."'"
Interestingly, both Scalia and Stevens conceived of Cardoza-
Fonseca as a Chevron step-one situation—the precise issue in question
being whether the two deportation standards were identical."' Hav-
ing decided that Congress did not intend the two provisions to have
identical standards, however, Justice Stevens did not state what the
proper section 208 standard should be. He appears to have been
prepared to defer to the INS's interpretation of section 208, pro-
vided that the interpretation is reasonable. i 42
Under a literal interpretation of Chevron, however, Cardoza-
Fonseca is a step-two case. Because Congress had not articulated
what it meant by a well-founded fear of persecution, courts under
Chevron should defer to a reasonable interpretation of the term
made by the agency. The problem with the INS's interpretation was
that it was not reasonable because it imported an interpretation of
one statutory phrase to a different, and presumably more lenient,
statutory phrase. In other words, although the INS had discretion
to develop a range of different standards, the standard it chose was
outside the permissible range of possible standards. 143
15" Id. at 446.
157 Id.
158 Id.
158 Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140 ,,r&
11 1 See id. at 446 (Stevens, J.); id. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"2 Id. at 448.
05 See id. ("We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the 'well-
founded fear' test should be applied. Instead, we merely hold that the Immigration Judge
and the BIA were incorrect in holding that the two standards are identical." (footnotes
omitted)). Just as Justice Stevens might have caused some unintended doctrinal developments
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Unlike Cardoza-Fonseca or Young, the Court's approach is more
balanced in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America.'" In Dole, the Court
declined to use some admitted ambiguity in statutory language to
invoke step two of Chevron. 145 At issue in Dole was an Office of
Management and Budget interpretation of the Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act of 1980 ("Act").' 46 In direct contrast to Young, the Dole
Court concluded that "[w]hile the grammar of th[e] text can be
faulted, its meaning is clear . . . ." 147 The Court's reading of the
text, moreover, was bolstered by "a consideration of the object and
structure of the Act as a whole."'"
In dissent, Justice White argued that the majority approach was
contrary to Chevron. 149 He stated that, in the face of admitted sta-
tutory ambiguity, the Court's view merely represented its preference
and that the Court could not rationally conclude that its interpre-
by his broad opinion in Chevron, he also might have gone too far in the other direction in
Cardoza-Forkseca. Despite the language in Cardona-Fonseca, justice Stevens apparently still
believes that agencies play a greater role in interpreting statutes than that of "desperation"
or "tie-breaker."
Justice Scalia made this point in a concurring opinion in NLRB v. United Food & Com-
mercial Workers Union, stating:
[This decision] demonstrates the continuing and unchanged vitality of the test
for judicial review of agency determinations of law set forth in Chevron .... If
the dicta of Cardoza-Fonseca ... were to be applied here, . . . we would be
deciding th[e] issue [in this case] conclusively and authoritatively, rather than
merely "decid[ing] whether the agency's regulatory placement is permissible"
. ... [This case is] decided correctly only because "the statute is silent or
ambiguous" with respect to an issue relevant to the agency's administration of
the law committed to its charge—which is the test for deference set forth in
Chevron.
484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446-
48).
144 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990).
145 The Dote Court stated:
[P]etitioner's interpretation of "obtaining or soliciting facts by an agency through
. reporting record keeping requirements" is not the most natural reading of
this language. The common-sense view of "obtaining or soliciting facts by an
agency" is that the phrase refers to an agency's efforts to gather facts for its own
use and that Congress used the word "solicit" in addition to the word "obtain"
in order to cover information requests that rely on the voluntary cooperation
of information suppliers as well as rules which make compliance mandatory.
110 S. Ct. at 934 (construing 44 U.S.C. § 3502(4) (1988)).
146 44 U.S.C. § 3501-3520 (1988).
147 Id. at 937.
"" Id. at 935.
1" Justice White stated that "by independently construing the statute rather than asking
if the agency's interpretation is a permissible one and deferring to it if that is the case, the
Court's approach is clearly contrary to Chevron." Id. at 940.
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tation was the "only one that CongieS. S" could possibly have in-
tended." 15°
In the Court's most recent commentary on the applicability of
Chevron, the Court held in 1990 in Maislin Industries, U.S. v. Primal))
Steel, that deference to an agency's statutory construction was in-
appropriate where congressional intent was unambiguous.' 5 ' Mais-
lin involved the validity of an Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC") policy allowing shippers to negotiate with certified common
carrier rates that were lower than the carrier's rates filed with the
ICC. Although section 10761 of the Interstate , Commerce Act
("ICA") states that a "carrier may not.charge or receive a different
compensation . . . than the rate specified in the [filed rate]," 152 the
ICC argued that, under section 10701 of the ICA, "[a] rate . . . or
practice related to transportation or service ; ... must be reason-
able."'" The ICC's position was that, once a carrier negotiated a
lower rate with a shipper, it might be an unreasonable practice to
require the shipper to pay the higher filed rate. The ICC argued
that it should have the power to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether collection of the filed rate would be unreasonable given
that a lower rate had previously been negotiated.'"
The Supreme Court held that, whatever deference would or-
dinarily be accorded the ICC's interpretation of section 10701, the
ICC did not have discretion to ignore the clear requirement of
section 10701.' 55 Therefore, the Maislin Court rejected the ICC's
interpretation either because Congress had addressed the precise
issue in question in section 10701 or because the Commission's
interpretation of this section was not reasonable.
In dissent, Justice Stevens attacked the decision as being un-
faithful to Chevron.' 56 He argued that section 10761 did not pre-
clude the existence of exceptions to the charging of a filed rate if
necessary to enforce section 10701 and that this type of determi-
nation was worthy of deference. Especially in light of amendments
made to the Act in 1980, he found the ICC's interpretation to be
reasonable.' 57 Although prior cases had required carriers to charge
' 5° Id. at 939 (White, J., dissenting).
151 110 S. Ct. 2759,2770 (1990).
)52 49 U.S.C. § 10761(a) (1982).
155 Id,	 10701(a).
154 frIcti.i/in Indus., 110 S. Ct. at 2764.
'" Id. at 2770.
06 See id. at 2779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id, at 2777-78.
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the filed rates, he found those cases to be of little relevance in
judging the ICC's present actions, because those cases reflected
deference to an agency's position that had since changed.' 58
Thus, although the Chevron two-step test 159 has proven useful
as an analytical construct in post-Chevron Supreme Court cases, it is
unstable in practice. Chevron has failed to generate a consistent,
easily applicable approach to the problem of judicial review of
agency determinations of questions of law. Although the cases em-
ploy Chevron's analytical approach, they do not reflect a consistent
underlying philosophy. At times, the Court appears to allow agen-
cies to subvert congressional intent, as it did in Young and Japan
Whaling. Other times, the Court constricts agency discretion to make
policy choices, as it did in Dimension Financial and Maislin. In light
of this post-Chevron history, and Chevron's unclear analytical under-
pinnings, it is time to analyze Chevron critically.
II. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CHEVRON
The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron is problematic for
several reasons. The Chevron two-step approach for judicial review
of agency interpretations of law has not generated a coherent, easy-
to-apply test in practice. The post-Chevron Supreme Court cases
offer little guidance in identifying the dividing line between step
one—when there is a finding of clear congressional intent, resulting
in no deference to the agency—and step two—when a statute is
ambiguous, triggering Chevron deference.'6° Even if courts interpret
058 Id. at 2779.
059 See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of this two-part test.
After this article was written, the Supreme Court decided yet another case bearing on the
Chevron doctrine. In Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 111  S. Ct. — (1991), the Court
deferred to the Department of Labor's conclusion that its interim regulations governing
claims for black lung disease benefits were, as required by statute, "not ... more restrictive
than" similar regulations previously promulgated by the then-existent Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. See 30 U.S.0 § 902(f)(2) (1988). This time, it was Justice Scalia who
dissented, claiming that Chevron had been misapplied. See Ill S. Ct. at — (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that, although the regulatory scheme was intricate, it was
not ambiguous and thus not a proper candidate for Chevron deference. Id. Further, he argued
that INJothing in our Chevron jurisprudence requires us to defer to one agency's interpre-
tation of another agency's ambiguous regulations." Id. Pauley thus serves as another data
point confirming that Chevron has not produced a stable, coherent approach to judicial review
of agency action.
II* Professor Pierce describes the two situations as involving "rear statutory interpre-
tation (step one of Chevron) and "creative" interpretation (step two of Chevron). Pierce, supra
note 22, at 308. It is unclear how the use of such labels aids judges in deciding actual cases.
Moreover, Pierce's labels appear to legitimate some types of interpretation, but not others,
July 1991J	 BLANK CHECKS	 787
Chevron as allowing them to employ all the familiar tools of statutory
construction to identify independently a range of interpretations in
keeping with congressional intent, 161 Chevron requires courts to de-
fer to agency interpretations within that range of permissible inter-
pretations. This article critically examines this aspect of Chevron.
First, adherents of Chevron have failed to provide a constitu-
tional justification for court deference. This failure is surprising
and troubling because, at least at first blush, the Chevron decision
cannot be easily reconciled with the constitutional role of the judi-
ciary. Chevron deference indisputably entails an alteration of normal
judicial functioning. In the absence of agency delegation, a court
presented with an issue of law would reach an interpretation; it
would not be content with the identification of a range of permis-
sible interpretations.' 62
 The refinement of statutory meaning in the
course of adjudicating bona fide cases and controversies lies at the
heart of the judiciary's function.' 63
 Indeed, there is nothing more
fundamental to our understanding of the Constitution than Chief
Justice Marshall's ringing statement in Marbury v. Madison that lilt
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is." 164
without providing a coherent theory for so doing. Currently, a rich and active debate is
taking place on and off the Court regarding how to interpret statutes. See Wald, supra note
16; see generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); R. DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM, 216-93 (1985);
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REV, 533 (1983); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).
How to apply Chevron is an interesting and important problem that raises significant
questions about the art of statutory construction. It is, however, tangential to my concerns
about Chevron.
161 This view of Chevron is most consistent with the Supreme Court's approach in Cardoza-
Fonseca. See 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987). See supra text accompanying notes 129-43 for a
discussion of Cardoza-Fonseca. I believe the Cardoza-Fonseca Court's formulation of the Chevron
approach to be the most palatable strong reading of Chevron. See supra note 129.
162 See Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821,
826-27 (1990) ("Of course I can—as can any judge—always determine which of the parties
has the better interpretation of a statute . . .").
L 09 As then Judge Starr observed:
[What the lower court did in Chevron was] analogous ... to what federal courts
have to do in diversity cases every day—divine what a state court might do if
confronted with this particular issue. To make a reasoned judgment, with
respect and restraint, about what the statute would have said if the question
had been put directly to Congress. This approach, whatever its demerits, at
least embodied a good faith attempt to vindicate legislative supremacy. It cer-
tainly was not, if I may use the term, an "activist" decision.
Judicial Review, supra note 22, at 359.
164 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Chevron is not required by the Constitution.'" Indeed, the prac-
tice of delegating "legislative" power to agencies rests on shaky
constitutional moorings. t66 The view that courts are required to
defer to determinations of law made by the agency to whom power
is delegated does not inevitably follow from the legitimacy of dele-
gating legislative power; a constitutional justification for diminish-
ing the ordinary powers of the courts is needed. Indeed, the fact
that agencies exercise legislative power in conjunction with execu-
tive power argues for a strong role for the judiciary in reviewing
agency action in order to curb possible agency bias.
Nor can Chevron be justified merely by relying on congressional
intent. Even if Congress intends courts to defer to the legal deter-
minations made by agencies,' 67 the expression of congressional will
does not relieve the courts of their obligation to assess the consti-
tutionality of Congress's action.'" If Congress may not require
courts to defer to agency interpretations without running afoul of
' 65 Even Justice Scalia, the most forceful proponent of Chevron on the Supreme Court,
does not argue that Chevron is compelled by the Constitution:
The [constitutional argument] can be rejected . . . by asking one simple question:
if, in the statute at issue in Chevron, Congress had specified that in all suits
involving interpretation or application of the Clean Air Act the courts were to
give no deference to the agency's views, but were to determine the issue de
novo, would the Supreme Court nonetheless have acquiesced in the agency's
views? I think the answer is clearly no, which means that it is not any constitu-
tional impediment to "policy-making" that explains Chevron.
Scalia, supra note 16, at 515-16.
166 The constitutionality of so-called independent agencies was a matter of great concern
in recent years. See, e.g., A Symposium on Administrative Law, "The Uneasy Constitutional Status of
the Administrative Agencies," 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 277-599 (1986). Concerns have subsided
since the Supreme Court's affirmation of the constitutionality of special prosecutors, see
generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, see generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Although the constitution-
ality of executive branch agencies is unquestioned, the proposition that legislative choices
may not be delegated to the executive branch retains some vitality. See, e.g., Industrial Union
Dept v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (1980). See generally T. Low', THE
END OF LIBERALISM 125-56, 297-99 (1969); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 Coaxtu. L. REV. 1 (1982); Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could
the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985).
167 It is far from clear that Congress so intended. The evidence is mixed, at best. See
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 468 (Chevron contrary to the judicial review provisions of the APA).
Justice Scalia makes an interesting argument that, given the lack of clear indicia as to
congressional intent on this matter, the Chevron rule amounts to a default rule on construction.
See infra notes 335-39 and accompanying text.
' 68 But see Monaghan, supra note 19, at 26 ("Judicial deference to agency 'interpretation
of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an agency.'").
See infra notes 193-97, 292-300 and accompanying text for a discussion of the delegation
argument.
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the Constitution, then it necessarily follows that courts may not
enforce this prohibition.
Second, the Chevron decision represents unwise political theory.
The modern administrative state operates in some tension with
constitutional text. Generally, agencies function as a fourth branch
of government that is not provided for in the constitutional scheme.
Commentators sometimes support the existence of the modern ad-
ministrative state because of the practical necessities of modern
governance.' 69 Similarly, commentators have defended Chevron as
furthering a sound political theory, namely, that policy choices be
made by politically accountable decision-makers."G This argument
is far too simplistic. It assumes too much about both the desirability
of majoritarian decision-making and the degree to which agency
action reflects majoritarian concerns. Such a political theory also
neglects the problem of agency bias and the role that courts should
play in correcting such bias."'
Finally, the Chevron approach, if uniformly applied to the full
range of agency action, could produce anomalous and unwise out-
comes. As a result, courts have refused to apply Chevron in certain
contexts. 172 In particular, Chevron can result in a lack of uniform
legal standards in situations involving parallel enforcement
schemes.'" Such exceptions to Chevron suggest, at the very least,
that Chevron is not an all-encompassing command for deference.
These exceptions also suggest general criteria under which Chevron
deference is inappropriate. More broadly, these exceptions serve to
underscore the flaws of the Chevron doctrine and suggest the desir-
ability of rejecting the Chevron approach.
In sum, Chevron deference presents three major problems.
First, Chevron, cannot be easily reconciled with the constitutional role
of the judiciary. Second, Chevron represents unwise political theory.
Lastly, it can produce unwise and anomolous results.
1°11 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 9, at 373-85; Strauss, supra note t4, at 581-83.
12° See infra notes 302-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chevron as a sound
political theory.
17 ' See infra notes 284-301 and accompanying text for a discussion of agency bias.
172 See infra notes 315-34 and accompanying text.
175
 For example, the antitrust laws may be enforced through private party suits, Justice
Department criminal action and FTC adjudication. See infra notes 302-14 and accompanying
text. Applying Chevron literally, courts could defer to both FTC and Justice Department
interpretations of the same issues of law, even if the FTC's and Justice Department's inter-
pretations differed from each other or from the interpretation that the court could make.
As a result, the same statute could be interpreted and applied in three different ways.
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A. Chevron and Article III
Article III of the United States Constitution vests the judicial
power of the United States "in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." 174 In addition, article III confers on the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction of both law and fact of all cases arising under
federal law, subject to exceptions and regulations by Congress.' 75
The notion that a court should defer to an agency interpretation
of law appears on its face to violate article III. Such deference can
be seen either as vesting judicial power in an administrative agency
that lacks the attributes of an article III tribunal or as restricting
the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction over cases arising under
federal law. Nevertheless, one can read article III as permitting
Congress to place certain limits on the power of the federal courts
to decide questions of interpretation of federal law. Congress's con-
stitutional power to create inferior courts could be interpreted to
allow Congress to establish inferior courts with jurisdiction to decide
only a portion of the available set of cases and controversies set
forth in article III. Further, Congress's constitutional power to make
exceptions to and regulations concerning appellate jurisdiction
could be interpreted to allow Congress to restrict the . appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
always found some restrictions on judicial authority to be constitu-
tionally permissible.
In this section, the article confronts the question whether a
congressional command for courts to engage in Chevron deference
is a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. This article concludes that judicial power to
make independent determinations of law is necessary in order to
validate constitutionally the delegated powers wielded by adminis-
trative agencies. Further, under article III, judicial power to make
independent determinations of law is necessary to validate the ju-
risdiction conferred on the federal courts to review agency action.' 76
I. Agency Power to Make Determinations of Law
It is long established that Congress may grant administrative
agencies the power to make interpretations of law.' 77 Typically,
174 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
175 Id. Article III grants the Supreme Court "appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." id.
175 See infra notes 284-301 and accompanying text.
X77
	 infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
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agencies do so in one of two modes: rulemaking or adjudication.'"
For reasons based primarily on procedural requirements, Congress
has drawn distinctions between the two modes of action. 17' More-
over, Congress does not always grant an agency both powers."'"
Nonetheless, agencies can use either of these methods to construct
a rule of law, that is, a determination of the rights and obligations
of a class of actors.' 8 '
Despite the similarity between these two modes, two discrete
doctrines have emerged delimiting agency power to engage in ru-
lemaking and adjudication. One, the "nondelegation" doctrine, gen-
erally applies to rulemaking. The other, the "reassignment of ju-
dicial authority" doctrine, generally applies to adjudication.' 82 The
separate development of these doctrines, however, is unfortunate
and misleading because they should be seen as complementary
doctrines that apply to all agency actions.
The nondelegation doctrine is triggered when Congress grants
power to an agency to make rules, that is, to set, rather than merely
implement, government policy. Under the present formulation of
this doctrine, Congress permits an agency to "fill-up the details"'"
of general congressional policies without violating notions of sepa-
ration of powers as long as these policies set forth "intelligible
principles" 184 capable of effective judicial review. 185
 Rulemaking is
subject to the nondelegation doctrine because it entails the agency
178 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554 (1988).
1"
 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, different procedures are generally re-
quired, depending upon the mode of agency action. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (setting forth
procedures for rulemaking) with id. 554 (setting forth procedures for adjudication). In
addition, the due process clause, U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV, may impose certain proce-
dural requirements on adjudication, but not rulemaking. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210
U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (imposing hearing requirements on an adjudication) with 13i-Metallic
Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915) (no hearing required in
rulemaking).
1 " See, e.g., Addison v, Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 623 (1944) (agency
given power to engage in rulemaking but not adjudication).
I"' Agencies, moreover, enjoy considerable latitude in the choice between acting through
rulemaking or adjudication. See generally Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983); NLRB
v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947);
Shapiro, supra note 49.
182 See infra notes 238-83 and accompanying text.
' 8' United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911).
184
 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
188
 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (Leventhal, J., concurring)
("Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly—and the courts have
upheld such delegation—because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises
the delegated power within statutory limits." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
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fleshing out congressional policies through official pronounce-
ments.
Yet agericy adjudications often raise the same concerns that the
nondelegation doctrine addresses, namely, agency formulation of
policy. The Supreme Court has long recognized that agencies can
formulate policy employing either mode: rulemaking or adjudica-
tion. The choice of mode is a matter left largely to the discretion
of the agency.'" The same concerns animating the nondelegation
doctrine apply, regardless of agency mode. For example, when
Congress empowers the FTC to prohibit unfair trade practices
through agency adjudications, Congress is delegating to the FTC
the power to formulate policy through law-making. The nondele-
gation doctrine should be applicable to constrain this congressional
grant of power in the same manner as in delegations exercised
using rulemaking power.' 87 In this light, all agency actions must be
in conformance with an "intelligible principle" set by Congress and
capable of judicial review.
Parallels to the nondelegation doctrine exist when Congress
delegates its law-making power to the judiciary, rather than an
agency.'" The exercise of legislative power by the judiciary is legit-
imate but bounded. It is bounded first by the principle of legislative
supremacy. That is, any common-law rule made pursuant to
congressional delegation may be overturned through legislative ac-
tion. 189
1" See supra note 181.
187 There is little doubt that the FTC Act survives the nondelegation doctrine test, and
I do not wish to argue in favor of a more restrictive nondelegation doctrine. 1 do wish to
emphasize, however, that an interrelationship exists between a lax nondelegation doctrine
and the principles of judicial review over agency action. This can work in two directions. If
we adopt a principle of limited judicial review of agency interpretations of law, some of the
problems so created could be addressed by beefing up the nondelegation doctrine. Requiring
greater congressional specificity would place more cases within the first step of Chevron. Some
commentators have argued for this result. See, e.g., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra
note 166, at 63-67; T. Lowi, supra note 166, at 297-99; Schoenbrod, supra note 166, at 1249—
71.
On the other hand, lax congressional delegations could be permissible if there is search-
ing judicial review. See Farina, supra note 99, at 486-88. Serious problems are raised, however,
when a lax nondelegation doctrine is combined with limited judicial review of agency action.
88 Common-law-making by the federal courts, the judicial analog to agency rulemaking
and adjudication, has not been seen as an inherent power of federal courts. See, e.g., Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general common law.").
Instead, the federal courts have developed common law only in situations where it is necessary
or desirable in achieving or vindicating federal interests in the absence of congressional
action. See generally D. CURRIE, FEDERAL Comm 353-70 (4th ed. 1990).
189 Thus, we have the anomalous situation that, although federal courts sitting in ad-
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Another doctrine, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, may also
limit common-law rulemaking by the courts. 19° Although most often
seen as a limitation on the powers of the legislature, this doctrine
is also a limitation on the powers of the judiciary. It precludes the
legislature from delegating certain policy choices to the courts to
make in the course of deciding cases.
Much of the business of the federal courts clearly entails the
type of policy-making activities performed by agencies. From "pure"
common-law adjudication in admiralty cases and disputes between
states, to the administration of "quasi-common-law" statutes such as
the antitrust laws,'" to "gap-filling" such as determining the limi-
tations period for a cause of action arising under federal law,' 92 to
"interpretation" of ambiguous language, courts make the types of
legislative choices that the Constitution vests in article I. The obvious
solution is to insist upon the ability of the legislative branch to assert
its supremacy when the judiciary, as an incident to the exercise of
judicial power, engages in legislative power in a way that violates
congressional will.
Thus, the modern process of law enunciation operates under
a dual scheme of delegation. Congress retains ultimate power to set
governmental policies through legislation. To the extent that a stat-
ute is unclear or leaves a gap that needs to be filled, however, either
an agency or the courts might make legal determinations. Congress
implicitly delegates law-making power to courts through the adju-
dication process. At the same time, Congress is permitted to dele-
gate legislative power to agencies.
Chevron implies that the delegation of legislative power to an
agency also represents a withdrawal of the implicit delegation to
the courts.' 93 This analysis is flawed, however, because a delegation
to an agency is only valid if the courts are permitted to ensure that
the agency acts in conformance with legislative will) Assuming
miralty apply principles of international law to resolve disputes, federal statutes can supplant
contrary international law principles. See G. CILMORE & C. Bt.Acx, supra note 52, at 45-47.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine permits certain statutes, particularly penal statutes,
to be attacked facially, on grounds that they do not identify with sufficient clarity, what kinds
of conduct are proscribed. Such challenges are permitted even if the pleader has committed
acts that are capable of being proscribed. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
191 See R. Posner, supra note 170, at 278, 288, 301-03 (analogizing the process of
construing the antitrust laws to common law adjudication).
192 See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983).
193 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
111 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 431-48 (1944); cf. Schecter Poultry
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that all congressional delegations to agencies set forth guidance
regarding agency action,' 95 judicial review assesses whether Con-
gress's will has been done. In effect, judicial review preserves the
principle of legislative supremacy.
One might argue, however, that Chevron accommodates the
concerns of the nondelegation doctrine by requiring that courts
review agency action for reasonableness. That is, as long as an
agency's actions are not contrary to congressional intent and are
made pursuant to congressional delegation, why should a court
overturn the agency's actions? Indeed, if the court overturned the
agency's interpretation, would not the court be vitiating the reason
for delegation to an agency?
The problem with this argument is that it confuses power to
make a legal determination with the correctness of that determi-
nation. The delegation doctrine confers power to an agency to make
a determination of law, provided that the agency is acting within
the scope of its delegated power.' 96 That determination must be
subjected to judicial review to determine if the agency's action is in
conformance with the statutory scheme.' 97 Chevron review cedes the
issue of correctness of an agency's interpretation to the agency.
Moreover, independent judicial review does not vitiate the rea-
son for delegating power to an agency. Legislatures have limited
ability to engage in meaningful fact-finding and analysis. Thus,
Congress often delegates power to an agency to fill in statutory gaps
because Congress believes that the agency will be best able to assem-
ble and analyze the facts needed to make legal determinations. In
addition, because the legislative process is not well suited to respond
quickly to changed circumstances, Congress also often grants power
to an agency that can adapt to changing conditions.
In contrast, courts are limited to party and case-centered fact-
finding. They might not be able to assemble the records necessary
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-42 (1935) (invalidating a delegation to an agency
that could not be effectively policed by judicial review); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 430-33 (1935) (same).
19!
	
process is required by the nondelegation doctrine.
196
	 extrapolating from Chevron, the clearer congressional intent is, the greater
the judicial power is to invalidate agency action. Yet courts are needed most in situations in
which Congress has not been as clear as it could be. In those situations, courts can play an
even greater role in assuring that agency action is in conformance with congressional goals.
'9' Cf. Industrial Union Dept v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 662 (1980)
(agency action within the scope of its delegated power invalidated because its action was not
in accordance with statutory scheme).
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to make informed factual assessments and formulate broadly ap-
plicable policies. When the agency makes its factual record and
assessments available to the courts, however, the courts can deter-
mine whether the agency's determinations of law are correct. Sim-
ilarly, although courts may not be able to respond to changed con-
ditions because of the case or controversy requirement, they can
review agency action, provided that the agency's action produces a
reviewable case or controversy. 198 Thus, the delegation doctrine,
rather than being a source of support for the strong reading of
Chevron, supports the principle of independent judicial review of
agency action in order to ensure that all determinations of law are
made in accordance with legislative intent.
Chevron can also be seen as reassigning a judicial function to an
agency. Namely, if Chevron is read as requiring a court to defer to
an agency interpretation of a statute, one can regard Congress as
withholding the traditional judicial function of law declaration from
the courts and conferring that function on an agency. This article
argues that Congress may not constitutionally assign this judicial
power to an agency without upsetting the principle of article III
supremacy over judicial matters. This argument proceeds from an
assumption that is similar to the nondelegation doctrine, namely,
that agencies may perform judicial functions incidental to their
constitutional function of implementing legislative schemes. Just as
article I bodies must ultimately exercise legislative power, however,
article III courts must also ultimately exercise judicial power. Thus,
administrative agencies can and do render interpretations of law.
If they do so while exercising judicial power, however, the courts
must be able to exercise their constitutional role by independently
deciding these questions of law. 199
198 See 5 U.S.C. 702 (1988) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof.").
199 Professor Rubin has argued that the very existence of broad delegations dictates that
courts take a deferential posture, Rubin, supra note 9, at 387-97; see also Strauss, Legislative
•Theoty and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 Cowm. L. REV. 427,441-45 (1989).
Rubin describes the trend of Congress to pass "intransitive" legislation that does not set forth
specific rules of law but creates an agency mechanism for developing these rules. Although
he recognizes that intransitive legislation is in some tension with the nondelegation doctrine,
he finds that practical necessities argue in favor of such broad delegations. Rubin then attacks
the concern that intransitive legislation impermissibly constrains the courts:
The second source of concern about standardless delegation is the desire to
give courts a job to do in the modern legislative process . . . . If one begins
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2. The Ability of Congress to Withhold Judicial Review of
Agency Action
Chevron, by requiring courts to defer to an agency's determi-
nation on questions of law, places a limit on the power of the courts
to set aside agency actions. It does not withhold judicial review over
agency action per se, but it does limit the scope of judicial review
over agency action. Nonetheless, the debate over Congress's power
to withhold judicial review of agency action is logically related to
the problem of limitation on scope of review and provides an ana-
lytic approach to the scope of review problem. This article, there-
fore, addresses both issues. It concludes that Congress may not
empower an agency to act without providing for judicial review of
the agency's action and that congressional power to prescribe the
scope of judicial review is also limited by the Constitution. 2°°
If Congress were to withhold judicial review over agency action,
it would be restricting the judicial power of the United States, which
extends to all cases arising under the laws of the United States. 20 '
One could raise three arguments to support such a restriction of
judicial power. First, article III does not create any lower federal
courts, but merely empowers Congress to do so. 2°2 Could not Con-
gress decide to create lower federal courts with jurisdiction over
only a subset of the full judicial power of article III? Second, al-
though the Constitution does establish a Supreme Court, Congress
is also given the power to regulate and make exceptions to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction. 205 Could not Congress make judicial
review of agency action an exception to the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction? Lastly, suits challenging agency action represent
suits against the government. Could not sovereign immunity pre-
clude judicial review in these cases?
from the a priori position that the judicial role must be restored, the delegation
doctrine is well suited to that purpose.
Rubin, supra note 9, at 396-97. To Rubin, however, judicial involvement is merely a question
of "implementation strategy, not of legislative theory." Id. at 415.
Rubin overstates the case. He focuses exclusively on the public-law nature of adminis-
trative action, ignoring the fact that only cases or controversies involving injured parties
reach the courts. When confronted with a bona fide case involving agency action, it is far
from obvious why courts should defer to agencies in service of implementation strategies.
Moreover, as Professor Strauss has observed, even if one accepts the legitimacy of intransitive
legislation, such legislation still sets boundaries on administrative action that courts can play
a useful role in policing. Strauss, supra, at 443 & n.51.
"0 See U.S. Const., art. 111, § 2.
2°1 Id.
202 Id. § 1.
2°' Id. § 2.
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These arguments fail for three reasons. First, due process re-
quires that agency action affecting liberty or property interests be
subject to judicial review. Second, the principle of separation of
powers argues for judicial review of agency action in order to pro-
tect against biases in agency actions. Lastly, as to agency action that
is judicial in nature, article III's requirement that the judicial power
of the United States be exercised by courts with judges enjoying
lifetime tenure with non-diminishing salary requires that an article
III court exercise independent review over agency actions. 204
With regard to the first argument for restriction of judicial
review—that Congress has the power to set the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts as it chooses—Congress apparently does enjoy
considerable leeway. 2°5 Exercise of this power, however, still leaves
the state courts free to review agency action.208 Congress's ability to
restrict the jurisdiction of all lower courts, state and federal, requires
additional constitutional justification. 207 It is axiomatic that courts
have the power to review their own jurisdictional grants for consti-
tutional infirmity. 208 A court could thus consider whether congres-
sional action withholding subject matter jurisdiction to review
20*
	 I.
"' See generally Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). The classic treatment of
this general topic is Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953), reprinted in P. BATOR, I). MELTZER, P.
MisnittN, D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
393 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. Other notable commentaries on the issue
include Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction,
65 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1985); Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 263-70 (1990); Fallon, supra note 26; Sager, supra
note 27.
206 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 423.
207 See id. at 423 (In the scheme of the Constitution, [state courts] are the primary
guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones). Many
commentators have argued that state judges, who are often not selected on a merit basis and
who often do not enjoy the guarantees of life tenure with nondiminishing salary, are imper-
fect substitutes for the article III judiciary. See, e.g., Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1105, 1121-24 (1977). Of course, Hart relies on the existence of state courts with
appellate review by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, even if state court judges
displayed bias or incompetence, the real value of state courts is to provide a pathway to the
Supreme Court whose Justices enjoy the guarantees of article 111. See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 205, at 423.
The state court/federal court debate has little relevance to the question of whether a
federal body lacking the attributes of article III may displace an article III court. The former
question deals with state/federal issues, whereas the latter question deals with separation of
powers issues. See Kramer, supra note 16, at 286; Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power,
and the Constitution, 65 IND, L.J. 291, 301-04 (1990).
2" See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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agency action is constitutional in the face of a charge that such a
restriction violates the due process rights of persons injured as a
result of agency action.
Commentators have long noted that many types of agency
actions involve the deprivation of a liberty or property interest, thus
triggering due process concerns. 209 They have sometimes seen other
types of agency action, often called "public rights" cases, 210 however,
as not involving a protectable right because they entail the conferral
or denial of a congressionally created benefit. 2 " Beginning with
Goldberg v. Kelly ,212 the Supreme Court recognized that benefits
created by statute could create entitlements that could not be with-
held without affording the party due process of law. Thus, Congress
may not develop a statutory scheme that confers benefits without
providing a constitutionally adequate remedy for those unlawfully
denied that benefit. With respect to agency action, the question is
whether such action without any judicial review is a constitutionally
adequate remedy for this type of property deprivation.
Little authority exists on this precise point. 2 u This lack of au-
thority may be the best indicator of how the Court would decide
the question. In past cases, when Congress appeared to provide
only an administrative remedy for deprivations of liberty or prop-
erty, courts have construed the statutes to find that Congress had
not precluded judicial review. 214
209 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 399-403.
210 See id. at 411 & 396 n.6 (discussing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)).
211 See id. at 410-11.
212 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg and the emergence of the role of due process has
severely undercut the soundness of Hart's distinctions in the dialogue. See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 205, at 410 n.27.
213 For examples of statutes appearing to preclude judicial review, see Note, Congressional
Preclusion of Judicial Review of Federal Benefit Disbursement: Reasserting Separation of Powers, 97
HARV. L. REV. 778, 778 n.4 (1984).
214 For example, in Johnson v. Robison, the Court construed a judicial review provision
to allow judicial review of a denial of a claim in the face of a constitutional objection. 415
U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974). Although Johnson was arguably limited to constitutional challenges,
most lower courts found it dispositive of nonconstitutional challenges as well. See, e.g., AFGE
v. Nimmo, 711 F.2d 28, 31 (4th Cir. 1980); University of Maryland v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 98,
99-101 (4th Cir, 1980); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1978).
But see Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902, 905-06 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
The judicial provision at issue in Johnson read as follows: "The decisions of the Admin-
istrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Admin-
istration providing benefits for veterans . . . shall be final and conclusive and no . . . court
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If a court had to grapple with unmistakable language, however,
an application of the test enunciated in the due process cases would
argue decisively in favor of requiring judicial review. Suppose, for
example, that a dispute involving a question of "merely" statutory
import, such as a question of eligibility under an entitlement pro-
gram, was precluded from judicial review. Under the test an-
nounced in Mathews v. Eldridge, 215 the court would consider three
factors: (1) the private interests affected by the governmental action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation caused by the procedures
being employed and the probable value of adding judicial review;
and (3) the burden that the additional procedures would place on
the government.216
It is difficult to see how the Mathews v. Eldridge factors could
fail to point unequivocally towards judicial review. Unlike the pro-
totypical administrative due process situation in which the issue is
the procedures to be employed before an agency could act, the issue
posed in this situation is the process to be employed after the agency
has acted. The only burden placed on the agency is the cost of
litigation.217 Even if we are prepared as a nation to allocate access
of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision." 38 U.S.C.
§ 211(a) (1982).
The Johnson approach was later described in a D.C. Circuit opinion:
[lit has become something of a time-honored tradition for the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts to find that Congress did not intend to preclude.
altogether judicial review of constitutional claims in light of the serious due
process concerns that such preclusion would raise. These cases recognize and
seek to accommodate the venerable line of Supreme Court cases that casts doubt
on the constitutionality of congressional preclusion of judicial review of consti-
tutional claims. This foreboding line of Supreme Court cases and the ominous
warnings of scholarly commentators have moved courts to apply the "clear and
convincing" standard to congressional enactments in part to avoid the consti-
tutional morass, as we do here.
Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695,699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (footnotes omitted). Indeed, the
court in Bartlett engaged in "creative," if not disingenuous, statutory construction to conclude
that a judicial review provision that precludes judicial review if the amount in controversy is
less than $1000 did not preclude constitutional challenges to a determination where the
amount in controversy was less than $1000. Id. at 700 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(C)
(1982)).
215 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
216 Id. at 332-35. For another example of the use of Mathews v. Eldridge in this context,
see Note, supra note 213, at 780,791-96.
217
 An additional monetary and time burden, of course, is placed on the court system.
To consider these types of costs, the problem of access to the courts must be substantially
reexamined. In any event, a blanket prohibition in judicial review would not be required to
satisfy this type of judicial burdens argument because a jurisdictional amount requirement
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to the courts on this basis,218
 the judicial system would be largely
self-regulating as to matters of cost efficiency. A private party would
only seek judicial review of agency action when the expected ben-
efits  of review21 ° exceed the cost of litigation. Thus, even if judicial
review is permitted, such review would tend to be sought only when
the first factor—the private interest at stake—is at least as weighty
as the third factor—the burden on the government.
The second factor—the benefits of judicial review—is thus
likely to be the decisive factor in the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis.
The benefits of such review are two-fold. First, and perhaps most
importantly, an agency's knowledge that its decision might ulti-
mately be subject to judicial review provides incentives for the
agency to act properly. 220
 Second, if the agency fails to act properly,
the court would be available for corrective action. The only argu-
ments against judicial review, therefore, are that either the courts
have no effect on agency behavior, and thus produce no beneficial
effects, or the courts reach the wrong answers. The former argu-
ment is belied by the facts—courts often reverse agency action. 22 '
The latter argument is more problematic. How do we know if
a court decision is right or wrong? As Justice Jackson pointed out
about the decisions of the Supreme Court: "We are not final because
we are infallible, but are infallible only because we are final."222 As
Justice Jackson's aphorism illustrates, one cannot conclude with any
degree of certainty that court or agency determinations are correct.
The presence of judicial review, however, increases the likelihood
that the ultimate determination will be correct. When both an
agency and a court agree on the correctness of a determination of
law, we have greater confidence in its correctness. When the court
and agency disagree, we might conclude that the judicial determi-
could alleviate such burdens. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 710-11 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
218
 I, for one, am not. It may make sense to develop alternative dispute mechanisms
that have a lower cost than traditional court proceedings. The purpose of doing so, however,
should be to reduce costs to litigants, not to reduce costs to the government at the expense
of litigants.
219
 By expected benefits, I mean the value of the relief sought multiplied by the prob-
ability that the claim will succeed.
"° This is one of the premises of the "hard look" doctrine. See generally Motor Vehicle
Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
22 ' See Schuck & Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Enipirical Study of Federal Administrative
Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1031 (court reversals or remands of agency action at 28%, the year
before Chevron was decided, and 17%, the year after Chevron was decided).
ni
 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) ( Jackson, J., concurring).
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nation is correct beCause it is made by a neutral observer.. The
agency's interpretation might suffer from some problems of bias. 223
Other commentators have attempted to demarcate cases in
which the courts' or the agency's interpretations should prevail.
Hart, for example, distinguishes between matters involving rights
from those involving privileges. 224 There is something quite odd
about an argument, however, that would permit the agency the final
word only in situations involving the conferral of a statutory bene-
fit.225 if we are to grant the agency the last word, on at least some
issues of law, it must be based on criteria that would point to
situations where we have some reason to believe that the agency is
more likely to reach the correct result than the courts. 226 In sum,
notions of separation of powers and due process reveal that Con-
gress may not preclude all judicial review of agency action.
The second argument for restriction of judicial review—
congressional power to preclude the Supreme Court's appellate
review—presents a weaker case. First, due process concerns would
not argue forcefully for mandating the possibility of Supreme Court
review. Second, article I I I and separation of powers concerns would
225 See infra notes 284-91 for a discussion of the problem of agency bias. To the extent
that an agency's view is informed by special expertise, courts should accord some persuasive
deference to the agency. See infra notes 362-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of'
special expertise.
224 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 410-11.
225 See Monaghan, supra note 19, at 24 ("the exercises of 'the judicial power of the United
States' cannot vary with whether a private litigant is a plaintiff or a defendant, so long as the
court is expected to enter a final judgment on the merits of the claim").
226 Similarly, a distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional issues is unsatis-
fying. See Monaghan, supra note 19, at 2 ("Marshall's grand conception of judicial autonomy
in law declaration was not in terms or in logic limited to constitutional interpretation"). This
"essential function" argument, which places constitutional issues on a different plane than
other issues, has considerable support. See Amar, supra note 205, at 220-22 (discussing the
essential function theory); Monaghan, supra note 19, at 32-34; Sager, supra note 27, at 56-
57. Recent scholarship, however, has offered a more unified theory of article 111. See Arnar,
supra note 205, at 235-39 (arguing that certain categories or article 111 cases must be capable
of being heard by an article 111 court at the trial or appellate level); Fallon, supra note 26, at
976-77 (suggesting that all categories of article III cases must be capable of at least appellate
review by an article. III court). The essential function theory may now be explained, in part,
as an application of the principles enshrined in footnote four to the Carotene Products case.
United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,152 n.4 (1938). Footnote four identifies
an active judicial role in the vindication of certain constitutional rights and a lesser judicial
role in the review of other claims. Id. See infra notes 375-391 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Carotene Products and its relevance to administrative law. Whatever the validity
of the Carotene Products principle in the general context of preclusion of judicial review, it
would appear to he limited to review of congressional, not agency, acts. See infra notes 378-
79 and accompanying text.
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appear to be satisfied as long as there is some article III participa-
tion. 227
 The only difficult question is whether principles of separa-
tion of powers and article III are satisfied if only state courts are
involved. 228
 As a practical matter, however, it is unlikely that Con-
gress would ever opt to provide for only state court review of federal
agency action without also providing for appellate review in the
Supreme Court.
Finally, the third argument for restriction of judicial review—
that sovereign immunity is a valid bar to judicial review—is
flawed. 229
 First, sovereign immunity would be applicable, if at all,
only if the agency is a defendant. 23° That is, an agency seeking to
compel a private party to act would not raise sovereign immunity
concerns. 2" Further, sovereign immunity only extends to claims
against the government. If a claim is raised against an official, such
as an agency head, immunity would not apply.232 Thus, sovereign
immunity would only apply in claims for money damages against
the government. Yet, the due process revolution has altered con-
ceptions of constitutionally protected interests in precisely this
area.233
 These recent constitutional understandings may vitiate the
rationale for the availability of sovereign immunity, 234
The due process revolution led then-Judge Bork to attempt to
reconceptualize the rationale for preclusion of judicial review. He
argues that even if sovereign immunity cannot be defended against
a due process challenge on the basis of historical precedent, it might
be justified in light of "the practical necessities of the administrative
welfare state. "255
 This argument for administrative necessity sweeps
too broadly. Although good arguments exist for reassigning many
227 See infra note 237.
228 Id.
223 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 398-99.
2" Id,
231
 Many administrative schemes are not self-enforcing. The agency must seek enforce-
ment through an action in the courts. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1988) (enforcement of FTC
order); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988) (enforcement of NLRB order). In these situations, a
sovereign immunity defense would be unavailing because the agency would be the plaintiff
in federal court.
232
 Officials might enjoy some immunity from suit for money damages. See Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978). Prospective relief may be awarded, however. See
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 528-43 (1984). The availability of relief against officials might
cause the government to waive sovereign immunity. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205,
at 398.
2"
 See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of these interests.
234 See Fallon, supra note 26, at 952-53.
235
 Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork, J., dissenting).
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judicial-like functions to agencies, these arguments do not carry
over to necessitating preclusion of judicial review."" Most commen-
tators have reached this conclusion, 237
 which is supported by the
case law. This case law uniformly holds that, although Congress
enjoys considerable latitude to reassign matters to non-article III
bodies, it must provide for probing judicial review of the decisions
of these bodies.
3. The Ability of Congress to Assign Judicial Matters to Agencies
The foregoing analysis has focused generally on the ability of
Congress to preclude judicial review of agency determinations of
law. When an agency makes such determinations in the context of
delineating the rights and obligations of specified parties in agency
adjudications, an additional constitutional issue is raised: namely,
does it violate article III when an agency, rather than a federal
court, exercises judicial power? A series of recent Supreme Court
cases involving reassignment of judicial authority to article I bodies
has addressed this question. 238
 Although these cases have produced
some fractured courts and much confusion, 239 they all implicitly
support a crucial dichotomy: although fact-finding may sometimes
be reassigned to article I bodies, law declaration may not be assigned
to such bodies. In order to maintain the checks and balances inher-
ent in our constitutional framework, judicial review of article I
adjudications must exist and independent review of questions of
law must be permitted:24 °
236 Administrative necessities may well implicate the timing of judicial review. See, e.g.,
P-TC. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 243 (1980) (finality doctrine); Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967) (ripeness); Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51 (1938) (exhaustion of administrative remedies). Once the
agency has finished acting, however, the only burden on administrative functioning caused
by judicial review is cost, which is largely self-regulating. See supra notes 217-19 and accom-
panying text.
237
 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 205, at 229-30 (arguing that an article III court must have
the power to participate in the adjudications of federal question cases); Bator, supra note 205,
at 268 (suggesting that initial assignment to agency is permissible if, among other things,
there is article 111 review); Fallon, supra note 26, at 933 (arguing that matters may be assigned
to non-article III entities provided there is article III review).
236
 Article 1 bodies include entities such as agencies and certain courts, such as the Tax
Court, courts of the District of Columbia, and territorial courts, that are composed of persons
who are not judges enjoying the protections of article III. It is somewhat of a misnomer
when referring to an administrative agency, which is most often identified as being in the
executive branch.
236 See Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and the Northern Pipeline Decision,
1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 202-04.
"° See also Fallon, supra note 26, at 983 (arriving at similar conclusion).
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The "reassignment of judicial authority" doctrine might appear
to have relevance only to agency adjudications. The scope of judicial
review of agency rulemaking, 241 however, necessarily affects parties'
ability to challenge The content of the rule in the context of a
subsequent agency adjudication or in a lawsuit brought initially in
a federal court. In either situation, the determinations of law made
initially in the rulemaking would be subject to independent judicial
review. 42 Because applications of a rule would entail independent
judicial review, it follows that, if the court reviews the rulemaking
directly, it needs to engage in independent review at that time as
well. Otherwise, the court would be faced with the prospect of either
overruling its determinations when the same issue is presented as
an 'application of the rule, or it would be bound by its earlier
determination, despite the fact that the prior determination entailed
deference to the agency.
Several recent cases address the ability of Congress to reassign
judicial business to article I bodies. 243 In 1982, in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the United States Supreme
Court declared that a grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy court
judges to hear all civil proceedings arising in or related to a bank-
ruptcy claim unconstitutionally granted article III judicial power to
a non-article III body.244 Although the case produced no majority
opinion, the various opinions confirm that, whatever the congres-
sional power to assign adjudicatory matters to non-article III bodies,
an article III court must conduct an independent review of issues
of law and some review of questions of fact. 245
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion stressed that article I bodies
are competent to adjudicate in three distinct areas. 246 The one area
2' 1 At present, judicial review generally is available under 5 U.S.C. § 702. The availability
of review, however, is sometimes tempered by the ripeness doctrine. See generally Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
242 If the application of the rule takes place initially in a court, Chevron apparently does
not apply. See infra notes 315-34 and accompanying text. If the application of the rule takes
place in the context of agency adjudication, the reassignment of judicial authority doctrine
requires independent judicial review of questions of law.
24 ' The important modern cases are Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568
(1985), and Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
24' Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87.
24' See id, at 73-76, 89, 92, 95.
246 The first two areas, courts martial and federal territories and districts, including the
District of Columbia, are not relevant to this article.
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relevant to this article involves "the constitutionality of legislative
courts and administrative agencies created by Congress to adjudi-
cate cases involving 'public rights.'"247
 Justice Brennan observed that
the claim in the bankruptcy proceeding did not involve a public
right, which he defined as requiring "at a minimum [a dispute]
`between the government and others. "248 Thus, the state-based
claim involved in Northern Pipeline could only be adjudicated by an
article III court within the federal system. 249
Justice Brennan's thoughts concerning the role of administra-
tive agencies, however, are highly relevant to the problem at hand.
Brennan first underscored the system of checks and balances pro-
vided by the Constitution and noted the fundamental importance
of an independent judiciary in that system of checks and balances. 25°
Brennan appeared to concede, however, that article I bodies may
adjudicate cases involving public rights25 ' because such cases are
covered by principles of sovereign immunity, "which recognizes that
the Government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued."252
Brennan did not argue that the Government may provide no avenue
for redress of public rights, only that it need not provide an article
III procedure. Further, Brennan suggested that article Ill review
of article I adjudication may be required. 253
g4'
	 Pipeline, 958 U.S. at 67 (footnote omitted). In the omitted footnote, Justice
Brennan noted that "Congress's power to create legislative courts to adjudicate public rights
carries with it the lesser power to create administrative agencies for the same purpose, and
to provide for review of those agency decisions in article III courts." Id. at n.18.
g48
	 at 69 (quoting Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438,458 (1929)).
2" Many commentators have criticized Brennan's categorical approach as lacking a
coherent rationale. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 205, at 243-53.
2'" Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58. Justice Brennan stated, lals an inseparable element
of the constitutional system of checks and balances, and as a guarantee of judicial impartiality,
Article III both defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch."
Justice Brennan summarized by stating that "our Constitution unambiguously-enunciates a
fundamental principle—that the judicial Power of the United States' must be reposed in an
independent Judiciary." Id. at 60.
Y.
	 Id. at 67.
2" Id. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,50 (1932)). Sovereign immunity
"recognizes that the Government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued." Id. at 67.
255 Id. at 69 n.23. Justice Brennan may have invoked notions of sovereign immunity and
separation of powers in discussing the public rights doctrine because of this suggested review.
Id. at 67. Sovereign immunity does not shield the government's actions from judicial scrutiny,
although it might preclude the judiciary from making initial determinations.
This limitation on judicial fact-finding is what was at issue in the cases that Brennan cites
in support of his public rights' doctrine: Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856), Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), and Crowell
806	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:757
In dissent, Justice White directly supported the proposition that
article III review of article I adjudications is essential under the
Constitution. 254 Justice White noted that "[t]here is no difference in
principle between the work that Congress may assign to an Art. I
court and that which the Constitution assigns to Art. III courts."255
The validity of an assignment to an article I court depends on the
extent to which the congressional scheme accommodates article III
values. 256
 To Justice White, judicial review of agency action played
a critical role in achieving a proper allocation of power between the
article I and article III bodies. 257
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agri-
cultural Products Co. clarified these positions regarding article III
review of article I decisions. 258 This time, the Court was faced with
an adjudicatory scheme in which claims were submitted to arbitra-
tion subject to article III review only for "fraud, misrepresentation,
or other misconduct."259 The Court was unanimous in result, but
not in rationale.260 Justice O'Connor appeared to adopt Justice
White's approach in Northern Pipeline, terming the arbitration pro-
cedure "a pragmatic solution to [a] difficult problem." 28 ' Turning
to the question of whether "the review afforded preserves the 'ap-
propriate exercise of the judicial function, "'262 Justice O'Connor
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). The Court did not attempt to preclude judicial review of
questions of law in any of these cases.
255 Justice Rehnquist's concurrence and Chief Justice Burger's dissent do not stake out
positions relevant to my discussion.
255
 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 113.
256
 Id. at 115.
257
	 White stated:
["The presence of appellate review by an Art. III court will go a long way toward
insuring a proper separation of powers. Appellate review of the decisions of
legislative courts, like appellate review of state court decisions, provides a firm
check on the ability of the political institutions of government to ignore or
transgress constitutional limits on their own authority. Obviously, therefore, a
scheme of Art. 1 courts that provides for appellate review by Art. III courts
should be substantially less controversial than a legislative attempt entirely to
avoid judicial review in a constitutional court.
Id. In a similar vein, Justice White quoted Crowell: "'[T]he reservation of full authority to the
court to deal with matters of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function
. .'" Id. at 110 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932)).
256 473 U.S. 568, 593 (1985).
2" See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1988).
266 Justice O'Connor wrote for five Justices (joined by Chief justice Burger and Justices
White, Powell and Rehnquist). Justice Brennan wrote for three Justices (joined by Justices
Marshall and Blackmun). Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion.
26' Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590.
262 Id. at 592 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54).	 .
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concluded that judicial review was adequate. 263 In doing so, how-
ever, she took an expansive reading of "fraud, misrepresentation,
or other misconduct" to permit reversal in situations in which ar-
bitrators "abuse or exceed their powers or willfully misconstrue
their mandate under the governing law,"264 commit "constitutional
error" and allow "whatever judicial review might be required by
due process."265
 Thus, although courts are surely constrained in
their review of arbitral awards, they appear constrained in much
the same way that courts are constrained with regard to jury awards.
Courts could review errors of law, although most applications of
law to fact, like jury damage awards, may not be altered. 266 Through
somewhat strained statutory interpretation, the Thomas Court re-
tained a vital role for the article III courts for questions of law.
Justice Brennan concurred in the result. 267 In so doing, he
clarified his position regarding the public rights doctrine. He rein-
forced the point that, even if a matter can be adjudicated in an
article I court, there must be article III review of that adjudica-
tion.268 He concurred in the result because he understood the ju-
dicial review provision in Thomas to "preserve[] the judicial authority
over questions of law." 269
Justice Brennan also expanded his view of how article III re-
view of article I adjudication implicates the separation of powers.
He noted that judicial review of constitutional questions is necessary
to constrain the actions of the legislative branch and, moreover,
judicial review of all questions of law is necessary to check executive
action.27° This review not only ensured an appropriate balance be-
tween the judicial and executive branches, but also the proper bal-
ance between the legislative and executive branches. 27 '
263 Id, at 592-93.
264 Id. at 592.
263 Id.
266
 This is in stark contrast to typical court review of arbitral awards where reversal is
not proper for mere errors of law. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808
F.2d 76, 78 (D.C. Cir, 1987).
267
 Justice Brennan apparently concurred rather than joining the majority opinion
because he desired to retain his categorization of permissible areas of article I adjudicatory
powers from the Northern. Pipeline case. Justice Brennan then had to fit Thomas into the public
rights category. This is no mean feat considering that it involved a dispute between two
private parties.
263 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 596 n.l.
269 Id. at 601.
270
 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 601 n.4.
271 Id.
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The third installment in the Court's article I court analysis was
CFTC v. Schor.272 In Schor, the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission adjudicated claims pendent and ancillary to a claim under
its organic statute. This time, Justice O'Connor garnered a solid
majority of the court for the White/O'Connor view. 273 Once again,
this opinion, as well as Justice Brennan's dissent, confirms that the
Constitution requires article III review of questions of law.
Justice O'Connor observed that article III "serves both to pro-
tect 'the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional
scheme of tripartite government,' and to safeguard litigants' `right
to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of government.'" 2" To ensure these
roles, article III courts must exercise the "essential attributes of
judicial power."275 This condition was met in Schor because article
III courts had "weight of the evidence" review over facts and "de
novo review" over questions of law. 276
The Court wrote the latest chapter in Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg. 277
 Although not squarely on point, the opinions are in-
structive in clarifying why the public right/private right distinction
in the cases is important. Granfinanciera is Northern Pipeline revisited;
it concerns the powers of the bankruptcy court to adjudicate a claim.
The precise issue, however, was whether the parties had been de-
nied their seventh amendment right to a jury. 278
 This time, Justice
Brennan carried a majority of the Court, with Justice White in
dissent. Brennan, again relying on the public right/private right
distinction, held that the seventh amendment does not apply to
public rights. 279
 This decision is important because it usefully dis-
tinguishes between reassignment of the judicial fact-finding func-
tion, which is sometimes susceptible to separation of powers and
seventh amendment challenges, and reassignment of judicial law
declaration function, which is susceptible to only separation of pow-
"2
 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
2"
 Justice Brennan dissented because he could not fit the claim adjudicated into the
public rights category. See id. at 865-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
214 Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473
U.S. 568, 583 (1985) and United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)),
'" Id. at 852.
• 276
 Id. at 853.
2"
 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
2" Id. at 35. The seventh amendment issue was not a problem in Marathon Pipeline
because bankruptcy judges had been permitted to empanel a jury. This power was removed
post-Marathon Pipeline.
279 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 41 n.4.
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ers challenges. It suggests that the publidprivate rights distinction
is relevant to the problem of reassignment of factfinding but not to
reassignment of the law declaration function. 28°
In the wake of Northern Pipeline, a groundswell in the legal
literature has arisen against the continued use of the public/private
rights distinction. Some commentators have argued that courts have
not consistently drawn this distinction over the years, and therefore,
it is suspect on that basis. 28 ' Others have argued that subsequent
legal events have undermined this distinction, most notably the
recognition of government entitlements as creating property inter-
ests subject to due process protections. 282
These cases thus point to a unitary conclusion: the article III
command that the judicial power of the United States be exercised
by article III courts is satisfied even when an article I body adju-
dicates, so long as an article III court is available to engage in some
review over factual conclusions and de novo review over legal de-
terminations. 283 One may best regard the public rights cases as
situations where article I bodies may conduct fact-finding without
2" Those who might have believed that public rights need not have article Ill deter-
mination of legal issues thus might be leading too much into the public rights cases. The
fact-finding limitation is consistent with the result and rhetoric in the cases; the limitations
on judicial review of legal issues are nut.
281 See Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through
Crowell to Schor, 35 Bui;FAeo L. REV. 765, 840-56 (1986).
282 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 26, at 952-53; Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article II!
Courts, 56 U. Cow. L. REV. 581, 593 (1985); Redish, supra note 239, at 204-14; Saphire &
Solimine, Shoring up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schur Era, 68
B.U.L. Rev. 85, 120 (1988).
Professor Bator's dismissal of the concept succintly makes the point:
In the modern administrative state, suffused by statutory and administrative
schemes that characteristically create complex interdependencies between public
and private enforcement, it is unintelligible and futile to try to maintain rigid
distinctions between questions of private and public rights . . . . And, in any
event, the answer really has no hearing at all on the question whether it is or is
not appropriate to dispense with the trappings of Article III adjudication. For
even if the "public rights" category were an intelligible and manageable category
(which it is plainly not), we still have not been told why the category is congruent
with cases where the use of an article I court or administrative agency is valid.
Bator, supra note 205, at 250. Professor Bator, of course, was nut oblivious to the arguments
made by Hart in the Dialogue. Bator was, after all, an editor of the HART & WECHSLF.R
casebook. He was simply not persuaded, nor am 1, by the distinctions made by Hart. This
can be seen as well in the additions to the footnotes from the Dialogue made by the editors
in HART & WECHSLER. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 410 n.27.
2" See supra note 226; see also Saphire & Solimine, supra note 282, at 139 ("Thus, we
conclude that the mandate of article III is only satisfied when Congress, in creating a non-
article Ill tribunal, makes available article III review of that tribunal's factual and legal
determinations. Most authorities have reached the same conclusion.").
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offending article III or the seventh amendment. Although sover-
eign immunity is implicated in these cases, the Constitution does
not allow the government to ignore harms inflicted on private par-
ties or to treat private parties illegally, even in entitlement cases.
The bearing of sovereign immunity is that the government has some
leeway to devise appropriate procedures for adjudicating claims
against the government. Such leeway, however, does not include
the leeway to preclude article III scrutiny of governmental action.
4. The Ability of Congress to Limit the Courts' Scope of Review
Although Congress has not attempted to preclude judicial re-
view of agency action, 284
 one can construe the strong reading of
Chevron as sanctioning congressional attempts to restrict the scope
of such review. Such restrictions violate the principles of separation
of powers because they place the power to set policy in the same
branch of government that implements policy. 285
 This .result inter-
jects the possibility of biases in the administrative process. 286 As
Professor Sunstein has aptly put it, "[t]he case for judicial review
depends in part on the proposition that foxes should not guard
henhouses—an injunction to which Chevron appears deaf." 287
 Agen-
cies are not neutral bystanders in the setting of government policy;
rather, they are self-interested players. The checks and balances in
our Constitution are designed to protect parties against such self-
interested action. 288
 The constitutional scheme of government
places article III courts in a vital role of protecting parties from
attempts by the other branches to overreach their powers. 289
Private parties also need an active judiciary to protect them
against the excesses of the modern administrative state. The Chevron
decision does not merely affect the integrity of the judicial branch.
284 See Farina, supra note 99, at 472 ti.81,
2" A more general limitation on the power of courts, such as the relief that courts may
award. is not as troubling from a separation of powers perspective as a limitation in scope
of review of an action taken by another branch of government.
2" See Strauss, supra note 26, at 308 ("Assigning prosecutorial responsibilities to an
adjudicator is an excellent way to covertly affect the adjudication."); see also Judicial Review,
supra note 22, at 375 (comments of Alan Morrison); Farina, supra note 99, at 476 n.98.
" 7 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 467.
'86
 See generally Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985).
2"
 The special attributes of the article III judge, lifetime tenure with nondiminishing
salary, protect the courts and enable their judges to act freely and independently. The role
of the courts follow from the mythic image of the principles, objective and detached judge
standing up to the king. See Resnik, supra note 282, at 611-17.
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Although commentators sometimes speak in terms of grandiose
public law principles, it would be a mistake to see judicial review of
agency actions solely as a matter of public law. 2" Although the
general problem of who ought to decide legal issues is an important,
if somewhat abstract, concern, litigants do not seek review of agency
action merely to facilitate the advancement of the law; they sue
because they have suffered injury. The Chevron Court's refusal to
use its judicial power to vindicate the rights of litigants in the face
of potential agency bias is a decidedly unattractive model for a court
to folio. w. 29
Commentators have attempted to defend Chevron-like limita-
tions on the scope of judicial review in a number of ways. For
example, Professor Hart focused on two arguments: the type of
proceeding and whether the question was one of "law" or "discre-
tion."292 Hart found the type of proceeding important because he
believed that certain types of government action could be shielded
from judicial review altogether. 293 Thus, according to this argument,
Congress presumably could limit the scope of review of these types
of cases.
Hart's first argument depends, in part, on the ability of Con-
gress to shield the courts from reviewing the particular class of case,
altogether. As discussed earlier, this argument is a dubious propo-
sition. 294 Even if that condition is satisfied, however, it does not
follow that Congress is free to place whatever restrictions it wishes
on courts once it chooses to make the case reviewable. Indeed, Hart
acknowledges congressional limitations when he notes that article
III would not permit Congress to instruct courts on how to decide
cases. 295 If Congress empowers an article III court to exercise ju-
dicial power, that court must be free to do so. Requiring courts to
give binding force to agency interpretations strips the courts of
judicial power and confers such power on the agency. 296
299 See Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to "Hard Look" Review, 1989 DUKE L.J.
538,541.
291
 It also represents a curious inversion of Marbury v. Madison. Marbury is premised on
the idea that a court must determine the law as an incident to its duty to decide cases. See
Sager, supra note 27, at 76-77. In Marbury, the Supreme Court discovered in its attempt to
vindicate Marbury's claim that it lacked the power to do so. In Chevron, the Court had that
power to vindicate the petitioner's claims, but decided that it was not a court's role to do so.
292
 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 403-04.
493 Id. at 410-11 (cases involving plaintiffs complaining about decisions in connection
with non-coercive government programs).
2" See supra notes 178-283 and accompanying text.
295 Id. at 400 (emphasis in original).
49°
	 Bator, supra note 205, at 250-51; Meltzer, supra note 207, at 305-06 & n.68.
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Hart's second argument is that a difference of constitutional
dimension exists between law and discretion. This argument is com-
mon in administrative law297
 and is one of dubious validity. 298
 When
a question of law suddenly becomes a question of discretion is not
apparent. Although Congress may grant an agency some discre-
tionary power in how it will implement a statutory scheme, that
discretion would appear to end once the agency has exercised its
discretion by making a determination of law. The agency must then
be subjected to judicial review. 299
Some commentators have maintained that courts must defer to
administrative acts of discretion because the courts have no basis
on which to reverse the agency. 30° If Congress delegates a matter
to the agency, they argue, a court has no basis to overturn the
agency's action as long as the agency has acted within the limits of
the delegated power. The court can review agency action, however,
based on how well it meshes with the scheme created by Congress.
Even in situations in which some ambiguity exists as to what Con-
gress might have preferred, one could make an inquiry whether
the option selected is the best option, given evidence of congres-
sional intent. It is one thing to leave a question to an agency to
decide; it is another thing entirely to say that whatever the agency
decides is permissible. Courts can meaningfully review agency ac-
tion, even in the absence of specific standards to guide review."'
Thus, the problem of congressional restrictions on the scope
of judicial review of agency action reduces, in form, to the problems
of withholding of judicial review and reassignment of judicial au-
thority. Courts must enjoy unrestricted power to review agency
determinations of law because, otherwise, agencies would be able
to deprive persons of liberty or property without due process of
law, the courts would be left without the ability to exercise an
essential judicial function, and too much power would be concen-
297
 See, e.g., Scope-of-Review Doctrine: Restatement and Commentary, 38 An. L. REV. 233,
235-36 (1986) (proposing strict judicial review of questions of law and arbitrariness review
of questions of policy); Levin, supra note 24, at 25.
29' See Monaghan, supra note 19, at 29.
299
 Thus, the failure of an agency to take action might not be subject to judicial review.
See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985). If such action is reviewable, it is a
deferential form of review. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 568 (1975). When
an agency in its discretion chooses to act, however, its actions are not shielded from review
because they were discretionary.
31"' See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 9, at 396-97.
30' To the extent that a delegation is broad, it will be more difficult to conclude that
one alternative is the best alternative. Thus, in those situations, a court is more likely to
uphold an agency's actions.
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trated in the executive branch. Any other result would be inconsis-
tent with the due process revolution and the resultant demise of
the public/private rights distinction; the nondelegation doctrine and
the principle of legislative supremacy; and the constitutional role
of article III courts as the ultimate bodies capable of wielding ju-
dicial power. Chevron does not fit in the context of a web of the
interrelated separation of powers doctrines that serve structural
values, as well as individual liberties.
B. The Strong Reading of Chevron as Political Theory
Some adherents of the strong reading of Chevron find it attrac-
tive as a matter of political theory. 302 Simply put, these adherents
posit that law ought to be generated by politically accountable actors.
They argue that Congress meets this requirement and therefore,
its policies should be enforced, at least when no counter-majoritar-
ian concern is implicated."3 In the absence of congressional action,
we must choose between judicial and administrative policy-making.
These adherents conclude that because agencies are more account-
able to the public, they should make, policy in the absence of
congressional action.
This argument assumes that agencies are politically accountable
because their decisions are made by people selected and removable
by the President. 304 The President enjoys some supervisory power
over agencies but, once again, this power is largely limited to ex-
ecutive departmental agencies. Although some commentators have
suggested that the President could exercise supervisory oversight
of independent agencies,s" 5 no President has chosen to do so."6
Even as to executive branch agencies, presidential control is indirect
" See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 22, at 309; Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political
Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 469, 520-23 (1985); Pierce, The Role of the
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1251-56
(1989).
"3 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
vigorous judicial review of governmental actions when counter-majoritarian concerns are
raised); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981).
"4 This assumption may be true with respect to executive departmental agencies, but
the argument is less persuasive when applied to independent agencies. Commissioners of
independent agencies appear to be on a footing similar to judges in that they are selected
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. To be sure, these commissioners
do not enjoy life tenure and may be removable for cause, but, in practice, given the high
turnover in the judiciary, it is unclear whether the President enjoys more control in the
composition of the independent agencies than he does in the composition of the judiciary.
"5 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 4, at 590, 662-67.
3"6 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (imposing certain
regulatory procedures and requirements on executive, but not independent, agencies).
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through the Office of Management and Budget, and is nonbind-
ing. 307 Indeed, some commentators have suggested that all agencies
operate outside of the direct control of any of the other branches
of government."
The very idea that an administrative agency reflects majoritar-
ian values is at odds with prevalent conceptions of agency action.
Our modern conception of agencies suggests that agencies act out
of the exercise of expertise" or as a result of "capture" by the
target of regulation. 51 ° Neither of these exercises of power is con-
sonant with majoritarianism. In the former conception, agencies are
elite organizations, immune from politics. In the latter conception,
agencies act at the behest of the group that they are regulating, not
at the behest of the public.
As a theoretical matter, the argument proceeds with a majori-
tarian assumption that is "neither established by nor easily recon-
ciled with the Constitution."'" It is peculiar to use majoritarian
concerns to defeat judicial review. If we accept this argument's
premise, then judicial review, which is necessarily non-majoritarian,
will always be defeated. At some point, however, one must confront
the fact that, although majoritarian concerns influenced the Con-
stitution, the structure of government involves a balance of major-
itarian and non-majoritarian practices and institutions, including
the establishment of an independent judiciary. 3 ' 2
If we accept the premise that the power to create law is vested
by the Constitution in the legislative branch, and that Congress may,
by leaving gaps in the statutory scheme, delegate some law-making
powers to either an agency or a court, it does not follow that courts
or agencies should fill those gaps however they see fit. Regardless
of who fills the gaps, the only way to ensure legislative supremacy
is to have the gaps filled in conformance with the legislative scheme.
A court should not fill in gaps in a statutory scheme based on its
political convictions, not because the court is not politically account-
able, but because the court would be usurping legislative power.
Indeed, in the state courts where judges are elected, and hence
politically accountable, judges decide cases employing the standard
907 See Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82
Nw. U.L. REV. 646,665 (1988).
'08 See Strauss, supra note 4, at 492-96.
"9 See, e.g., J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
33° See, e.g., T. Lowi, supra note 166, at 125-56,297-99.
'" Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 488 (1982).
See id.
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tools of decision: stare decisis, legislative intent and judicial re-
straint.
Similarly, one cannot assume that, because Congress has dele-
gated a matter to an agency rather than a court, Congress intended
a political solution to the problem. It is one thing to realize, as
Justice Stevens does in Chevron, that Congress sometimes defers to
an agency to make policy choices. It is quite another thing to con-
clude that, because of this deference, a political decision is accept-
able or desirable. 3 i 3
In short, the strong reading of Chevron as political theory,
marked by reliance on majoritarian concepts, goes too far. Although
the Constitution might favor legislative action because of majoritar-
ian concerns, there is no support for the extension of majoritarian
concerns to render administrative determinations superior to those
of courts. 314
C. Exceptions to the Strong Reading of Chevron
Despite the broad pronouncements of Chevron, courts have
refused to apply the strong reading of Chevron in certain situations.
Courts developed these exceptions based largely on concerns over
agency bias. The existence of exceptions to a general rule inevitably
raises concerns over the proper scope of the rule and the exceptions
to that rule. After identifying the exceptions and their rationales,
SID
	 point was made graphically in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co„ 463 U.S. 29 (1983). In that case, the Secretary of
Transportation was empowered to make decisions with regard to passive restraints on pas-
senger cars—a politically charged issue with which Congress probably did not wish to deal.
Id. at 36-38. President Reagan had made a campaign issue over such regulations and their
effects on the automotive industry. Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Secretary's
decision to abandon passive restraint requirements was a perfect example of politics in action.
Id. To a majority of the Supreme Court, however, the Secretary was not to decide on the
basis of politics but on the basis of fact and expertise. Id. at 46-57. A decision, no matter
how much in keeping with political will, had to be justified with respect to congressional
goals and supported in those terms. When a decision is not supported with respect to
congressionally-authorized goals, it will not be upheld on judicial review, even if it could be
supported based upon such goals. See, e.g., independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v.
Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 854-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 (1987).
314
 Professor Mashaw has advanced a variant on the majoritarian theory. Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
He argues that the executive is the most accountable branch, and that agencies are the entities
most likely to produce coherent policies. Accordingly, broad delegations to agencies are
desirable and, presumably, courts should be ready to defer to administrative choices. Id. at
91. Mashaw's theory, however, appears to ignore a vital concern about the workings of
administrative agencies: the question of bias. See supra notes 284-291 and accompanying
text.
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this article concludes that the same concerns that justify the excep-
tions to Chevron cast doubt on the propriety of Chevron in general.
One exception to Chevron applies to the enforcement of crim-
inal laws. Although the Justice Department is an administrative
agency exercising delegated power to enforce the penal statutes,
courts have not accorded its interpretation of the criminal law any
deference."' This exception to Chevron appears to be premised on
two assumptions. First, a concern over agency bias arises because
the agency that enforces a statute may do so overzealously. 3 ' 6 Sec-
ond, the fact that enforcement must take place in the courts might
negate any inference of congressional intent to require courts to
defer to agency interpretations. Both of these assumptions seem
warranted. 3 ' 7
It is not clear, however, why this exception should be limited
to criminal law situations. Whenever a court accords deference to
an agency position, the spectre of agency bias is raised. 318 Because
virtually all agency actions are reviewable in federal court, and many
administrative schemes may only be enforced through court or-
der, 319
 why would one assume that Congress would want deferential
review over agency action as a general proposition? The logic of
the criminal law exception casts doubt on the soundness of Chevron
itself.32"
35 As Justice Scalia has explained:
[The vast body of administrative interpretation that exists . . . is not an admin-
istrative interpretation that is entitled to deference under [Chevron]. The law in
question, a criminal statute, is not administered by any agency but by the courts
. . . The Justice Department, of course, has a very specific responsibility to
determine for itself what this statute means, in order to decide when to prose-
cute; but we have never thought that the interpretation of those charged with
prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference.
Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997,1011 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original),
"6 See id. at 1011-12 (reasoning that the Justice Department would tend to interpret
statutes expansively, so as to make more conduct illegal).
317
 Of course, this article maintains that congressional intent is ultimately irrelevant
because Congress lacks the power to restrict judicial review to that extent. See supra notes
284-301 and accompanying text. Even if one accepted the validity of the concept that
congressional intent can influence the courts' posture to administrative action, however, there
are good reasons to suspect that congressional intern to have courts defer to agency action
is lacking in this context.
3 ' 8
 See supra notes 284-91 and accompanying text For a discussion of agency bias.
" 9
 See, e.g., supra note 231.
32° Judge Starr addressed the problem as follows:
[Wjhile courts recognize the inevitability and, in certain contexts, the desirability
of legislation that leaves some details to be resolved as the statute is applied,
there are limits ..
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Chevron is also inapplicable in situations involving parallel en-
forcement modes, such as the antitrust laws. Under the Sherman
and Clayton Acts, antitrust policy is enforced in three ways: private
party suits, criminal actions brought by the Justice Department, and
FTC adjudications."' First, Chevron is clearly inapplicable in private
party suits because there is no agency to which to defer. Second,
courts do not defer to Justice Department determinations, presum-
ably because of the aforementioned criminal law exception to Chev-
ron. Lastly, with respect to FTC adjudications, courts have decided
legal questions independently of the FTC, according persuasive
deference to the agency's position at best. 322
One cannot explain judicial posture in the antitrust arena in
Chevron terms. Under Chevron, only three factors remove the re-
viewing court's obligation to give- deference to the FTC. Two of
these factors, that Congress has addressed the precise issue in ques-
tion and that the agency's interpretation is not reasonable, are un-
likely to occur given the loosely textured, common-law-like nature
of the antitrust laws. Under Chevron, the less specific a statutory
mandate, the more likely a court would have to defer to the agency
interpretation. In addition, the courts generally adopt the agency's
position, meaning that the position was, in fact, reasonable. The
That is to say. the law of crimes must be clear. There is less room in a
statute's regime for flexibility, a characteristic so familiar to us on this court in
the interpretation of statutes entrusted to agencies for administration. We are,
in short, far outside Chevron territory here.
United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
The criminal law exception, however, cannot be explained in terms of statutory clarity.
To the extent that a criminal statute is unclear, we might expect a court to refuse to enforce
it. See supra note 190. The criminal law exception to Chevron, however, admits that statutes
may contain some interpretative gaps, but finds that such gaps are to be filled by courts and
not agencies.
911 Moreover, the antitrust laws are the type of loosely structured laws that give rise to
many "gaps" that must be judicially filled, See -Pierce, supra note 22, at 304; R. POSNER, supra
note 170, at 300-02.
"" Courts often defer to the FTC when it is the only enforcer of a provision. Thus, for
example, courts frequently defer to FTC positions construing section 5 of the Clayton Act
when the FTC attempts to identify unfair trade practices that would not constitute violations
of the specific provisions of the antitrust laws. Even in section 5 cases, however, the Supreme
Court asserts its role as ultimate authority on what constitutes a section 5 violation. See, e.g.,
FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986) ("The legal issues presented .
are ... for the courts to resolve, although ... the courts are to give some deference to the
Commission's informed judgment that a particular commercial practice is to be condemned
as 'unfair.'").
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courts arrive at their conclusion independently of the agency, how-
ever, and not as the result of deferential review. 523
The third factor is congressional intent. To argue that congres-
sional intent precludes deference suggests that Congress did not
implicitly or explicitly delegate law-making power to the agency.
Yet congressional delegation to the FTC is explicit and parallel in
language to other congressional grants of power to agencies that
confer Chevron deference to the agency. 324 Further, courts appar-
ently grant varying amounts of deference to the FTC, depending
on the nature of the FTC's activity. For example, if the FTC is
engaged in determining which practices constitute unfair trade
practices that fall short of antitrust law violations, courts will often
defer to the FTC. 325 If, on the other hand, a specific antitrust
violation is at issue, the court gives no deference to the FTC. 326
Thus, none of the recognized exceptions to Chevron appears to
apply in parallel enforcement schemes, such as antitrust law. None-
theless, it is easy to understand why courts are reluctant to defer to
the FTC. Such deference could result in either inconsistent legal
standards or FTC dominance. Suppose, for example, that Congress
has not specifically addressed a particular issue of law under the
antitrust law. A court faced with this particular issue in the context
of a private antitrust action, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, would arrive at a conclusion of law. Assume that some-
time thereafter, the FTC confronts the same issue of law, decides
that the court's interpretation was wrong, and adopts a contrary
position.327
What is a court to do upon judicial review? Under Chevron, it
should recognize that, because Congress has not addressed the
323
 See, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 456-59 (independent conclusion that,
under section I of the Sherman Act, the legality of industry practice should be analyzed
using a rule of reason test).
324
 For example, the delegation to the NLRB is almost identical in language and purpose
to the delegation to the FTC. Compare 15 U.S.C. 45(a) (1988) (FTC empowered to prevent
persons "from using unfair methods of competition") with 29 U.S.C. I) 160(a) (1988) (NLRB
empowered to "prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice").
325 See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374,385-86 (1965).
326
 See, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 456-59.
327
 The FTC, not a party to the earlier suit, is not bound by the legal determination in
that suit. See Greenbaum, Government Participation in Private Litigation, 21 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 853,
950-64 (1989). Even if the FTC had been a party to the earlier suit, agencies of the federal
government are generally not bound by prior determinations absent mutuality of the parties.
See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154,158-59 (1984). In fact, agencies often refuse to
alter their practices in the face of adverse rulings by lower courts—a practice termed agency
nonacquiescence. See generally Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiesence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989).
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precise issue, it ought to defer to the agency's interpretation, if
reasonable. Because the court had previously arrived at a contrary
interpretation, it does not follow that the agency's interpretation is
necessarily unreasonable. This difference simply means that, in the
face of statutory ambiguity, the court decided that the best inter-
pretation of a statutory provision is X. Yet, the agency's decision
that the best interpretation is Y may also be a reasonable position. 328
If the court defers to the agency's interpretation per Chevron,
the question of the validity of its earlier holding remains. The
rationale of Chevron implies that, outside the scope of delegation to
the agency, no deference to the agency is warranted. Thus, the
court would adhere to its earlier holding in all cases not involving
the agency. This result would lead to the same statutory language
carrying different meanings, depending on the enforcement mech-
anism."9
 Such a result places intolerable demands on legal actors
attempting to conform their conduct to these differing legal
norms. 33°
The alternative, however, acceptance of the agency view for all
contexts, is also unacceptable. Not only would it extend agency
power beyond Chevron limits, it would also upset the balance of
powers, thereby making the agency superior to the courts. More-
over, in statutory schemes employing Justice Department actions as
well as agency adjudications, agency determinations result in the
agency binding the Justice Department as well as the courts. It is
not surprising, therefore, that courts seek to avoid the entire prob-
lem by not deferring to the agency."'
528
 A similar situation is presented when circuit courts differ on the meaning of a
statutory term. Although only one interpretation is "correct," we do not consider it illegitimate
for the courts to disagree. Indeed, the existence of intercircuit conflicts is an expected incident
of the federal court system and furnishes a justification for Supreme Court review of a lower
court decision. See Sup. Ct. R. 10.
329
 See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 148 &
n.77 (1955).
3" This problem exists in the context of intercircuit conflicts as well. Set generally Note,
Using Choice of Law Rules to Make Intercircuit Conflicts Tolerable, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1078,1082—
85 (1984). Courts can address the intercircuit conflict problem, however, through the use of
venue or choice of law rules. See id. at 1088-97.
3S1
 Similar problems develop if the agency construes a statutory provision before the
courts. If the reviewing court applies Chevron, it must accept a reasonable agency interpre-
tation even if it is not the interpretation the court would have reached independently. In a
later private action, however, no basis exists for a court to adopt the agency's position. Courts
should ignore Chevron in this context in order to have a unitary judicially-made rule of law
apply in all enforcement contexts. For examples of courts not deferring to agency interpre-
tations in enforcing the antitrust laws, see Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987); Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.
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Parallel enforcement schemes exist in many other contexts.'"
Indeed, by logical extension, whenever a statutory scheme provides
for private remedies in addition to agency enforcement, Chevron
should be inapplicable. 333 If nothing else, these exceptions prove
that the Constitution does not require Chevron, which must be
thought of either as a court-created doctrine or one resulting from
legislation. If Chevron is the latter, it is an incoherent and unpre-
dictable doctrine because one is left uncertain as to when Congress
intends for courts to defer. If, instead, Chevron is a court-created
doctrine, its exceptions raise a concern that might call for the abo-
lition of the doctrine; that is, active judicial review might be needed
to curb the zealous interpretations made by agencies empowered to
enforce statutory schemes. 3 ' 1
D. Deference as a Canon of Interpretation
Recently, justice Scalia elaborated on his interpretation of Chev-
ron."' He views Chevron as creating a rule of statutory interpretation
that requires a court to presume that a question is left to the dis-
cretion of the agency, whenever congressional intent regarding
scope of review is unclear. 336 Justice Scalia notes that this presump-
tion is not based on any notion of constitutional or political theory,
but is merely a convenient and easily understood baseline assump-
tion that Congress could alter on a case-by-case basis."?
Justice Scalia arrives at this theory, in part, because he rejects
the idea that Chevron is compelled by the Constitution. He observes
that if Congress wished to have the courts independently review
agency interpretations of law, Congress could do so and courts
would find Congress's action constitutional. 338 Scalia never ad-
1985); Russell Stover Candies v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983); TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647
F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1981); RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rend 390 U.S. 341
(1968); Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v.
FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
352
 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k, 78u, 78u-1, 78ff (1988) (creating parallel enforcement
scheme under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
"' See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 867 F.2d 1448,1451-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
'34 See supra notes 284-291 and accompanying text for a discussion of this concern over
agency bias.
335 See generally Scalia, supra note 16, at 511-21.
"" Id. at 516.
9'7 Id. at 517.
3" Id. at 515-16.
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dresses the obverse proposition, however, that Congress cannot
restrict judicial review of agency action."9 If such restrictions are
impermissible, as this article suggests, it is improper to assume, even
as a baseline assumption, that Congress wishes the court to defer
to agency interpretations of law.
WHAT IS LEFT?: PRUDENTIAL DEFERENCE
Chevron deference is contrary to the framework of checks and
balances created by the Constitution. 34 ° Should courts therefore
never accord deference to the legal interpretations made by agen-
cies? Such an argument would be inefficient, counter-productive
and violative of long-standing Supreme Court precedent." 91 Courts
should give deference to administrative determinations of law, but
not the kind of deference urged by adherents of the strong reading
of Chevron. Judicial deference to agency determinations should be
a prudential device employed to serve a number of goals, including
facilitating the separation of powers and ensuring the proper role
of the courts.
This article now considers two alternative Models of prudential
deference: a managerial model suggested by Professor Strauss, and
an interbranch cooperative model.
A. Deference as a Managerial Tool
Peter Strauss has argued that Chevron is best seen as an attempt
to ensure uniformity in federal administrative law."42 The sheer size
and complexity of the modern administrative state produces many
administrative actions that are subject to judicial review. Because of
the limited adjudicatory capacity of the Supreme Court, it can only
review a small percentage of these cases. 343
This limitation generates certain problems for the enforcing
agency. First, the agency must decide how to respond to an unfa-
vorable ruling by a lower court. The agency would find adherence
to the lower court ruling unacceptable in many situations. 344 Assum-
"9 See Sager, supra note 27, at 37 ("When Congress undertakes to limit jurisdiction, it
is fully bound by the constitutional limitations that ordinarily constrain its behavior.").
34° See supra notes 177-301 and accompanying text.
341 See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
342 Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 CoLum. L. REV. 1093,1118-26 (1987).
345 Id. at 1096-1100.
3" See generally Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 327.
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ing that the Supreme Court declines to review the case, the agency
must either adhere to a ruling it believes to be wrong or follow a
policy of nonacqueiscence by choosing to comply with the ruling
only with respect to the affected party or within the geographic
reach of the court. 345 Nonacquiescence results, however, in a lack
of uniformity in the law. This lack of uniformity creates adminis-
trative burdens as well as concerns about unequal treatment among
regulated parties. Even if the agency's decision is upheld by a lower
court, because that decision is not binding on nonparties or on
courts outside a lower court's geographic reach, the agency's policy
remains vulnerable to later attack. Indeed, the primary basis upon
which administrative action merits Supreme Court review is the
presence of an intercircuit conflict. 346
In light of this limitation, Strauss contends that Chevron makes
sense when one conceives of it as a managerial tool. Strauss argues
that agency concerns about uncertainty are diminished when agency
decisions are subject to the deferential form of review Chevron im-
poses. In addition, Strauss contends that Chevron deference reduces
to a more manageable number the number of cases in which courts
strike down agency action. He further argues that such deference
might even limit the number of administrative law cases that the
Supreme Court must accept for review, thereby freeing the Court
for other matters. 347
Strauss's interpretation of Chevron is novel and provocative.
Although it acknowledges that Chevron deference is a prudential
doctrine and is required neither by the Constitution nor by legis-
lative intent, Strauss's interpretation is not an attractive prudential
doctrine. First, it overstates the problems of uncertainty that agen-
cies face. Agencies can often eliminate uncertainty by using rule-
making to formulate policy. Once the agency seeks review of the
final rule, the rule, if upheld by the courts, will be binding. 348
Second, if an agency rule is struck down by the courts, a separation
of powers, not a mere managerial, problem is presented. Because
Chevron appears to apply to the Supreme Court as well as the lower
courts, it places agencies on a superior plane to courts. This defer-
ence might be defended on constitutional, political or functional
545 Id.
"6 See Sup. Ct. R. 10.
"7 See Strauss, supra note 342, at 1121-22.
"8
 A failure to seek review could preclude later consideration of the claim. See Eagle-
Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905,909-12 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Even if not precluded, a later
action would be decided with the persuasive, if not binding, effect of the earlier judgment.
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grounds, but it takes the managerial argument too far to make it
carry this much weight.
Third, even if one views Chevron as a managerial device, it is
not the best managerial device. Several other possible devices could
address the problem of lack of uniformity in federal law more
efficiently. For example, a national appeals court319 or more limited
venue over agency action 35° could handle uniformity problems while
doing less harm to the balance of powers between the legislative
and judicial branches. 35 '
Lastly, the managerial approach effectively removes the judi-
ciary's role in administrative law. As a managerial device, it is anal-
ogous to a supervisor "eliminating" his problems of supervision by
allowing his employees to supervise themselves. In effect, it pays
short shrift to the bias objection to Chevron—that "foxes should not
guard henhouses."352
B. Interbranch Cooperation
The Supreme Court has consistently indicated, both before and
after Chevron, that courts should often defer to the legal interpre-
tations of agencies. The problem with Chevron is not that it places
courts in a deferential posture; the problem is the kind of deference
Chevron appears to require. This article, however, proposes a dif-
ferent model of deference with a different rationale. For a number
of principled reasons, courts should often give persuasive deference
to agency interpretations of law. 353
First, the existence of statutory ambiguity could give rise to
some deference to agency interpretations. Part of the difficulty with
349 See Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400,
1410-14 (1987). See generally S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S
ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL. JUDICIAL PROCESS (1986).
35° See McGarity, Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Administrative Action,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 302,356-75 (1980); Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform,
49 U. Cm. L. Rev. 976,990-1000 (1982).
331
 There are serious drawbacks to a national appeals court as a solution. Venue choice,
on the other hand, appears to be a sensible approach in the agency context. For an assessment
of these and other alternatives, as well as an argument that courts make too much of the
problems of uniformity, see generally Note, supra note 330.
352 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 467.
353 See Breyer, supra note 21, at 370 (congressional intent is really a legal fiction for
"practical features of the particular circumstance to decide whether it 'makes sense,' in terms
of the need for fair and efficient administration of that statute in light of its substantive
purpose, to imply a congressional intent that courts defer to the agency's interpretation.");
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 466.
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the two step approach in Chevron is that it views statutory interpre-
tation as a binary choice: either Congress has addressed the precise
issue in question—resulting in no deference to the agency's inter-
pretation, or Congress did not—triggering Chevron deference. This
view is an oversimplication of statutory interpretation. 354 Most text
is capable of more than one plausible interpretation. Unless one
adopts canons of statutory construction that limit the range of plau-
sible interpretations, virtually all questions of interpretation logically
fall into the second of Chevron's two-step approach. 355
If a court does not construe statutes literally, 356 the rigidity of
Chevron becomes either a straitjacket or an obstacle to be circum-
vented. It is a straitjacket to those who candidly discuss the ambi-
guity in a statute, 357 but it is an obstacle for courts that, given the
ramification of Chevron's approach, attempt to find a statute to be
"clear" despite other plausible interpretations. 3" Thus, Chevron may
have merely shifted the deference/no-deference debate into a de-
bate over statutory interpretation. 359
954 See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 467 ("ambiguities are not always delegations").
"" Justice Scalia, an adherent of restrictive canons of intrepretation, has observed:
In my experience, there is a fairly close correlation between the degree to which
a person is (for want of a better word) a "strict constructionist" of statutes, and
the degree to which that person favors Chevron and is willing to give it broad
scope. The reason is obvious. One who finds more often (as I do) that the
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with
other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron
deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept
an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.
Contrariwise, one who abhors a "plain meaning" rule, and is willing to permit
the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the legislative history,
will more frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much
broader range of "reasonable" interpretation that the agency may adopt and to
which the courts must pay deference. The frequency with which Chevron will
require that judge to accept an interpretation he thinks wrong is infinitely
greater.
Scalia, supra note 16, at 521 (emphasis in original).
"6 Most Justices, judges and lawyers view the interpretation of statutes as a search for
meaning guided, but not solely determined by, the plain meaning of the text. See generally
W. EsKuincE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 569-828.
"7 One wonders whether Chevron itself would have been deemed worthy of Supreme
Court review if Judge Ginsburg had been less forthright about the ambiguity of the statutory
scheme in the opinion for the D.C. Circuit.
"8 See Continental Air Lines v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444,1447-48 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) ("The parties have jousted skillfully (and at length) over the meaning of the key
provision .... {Me cannot but observe ... the irony of diametrically opposed positions .. .
that the statute is clear.").
1" See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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Instead, courts should candidly acknowledge that statutory
meaning is often ambiguous, but not indeterminate. If forced to do
so, courts could arrive at a "best" interpretation. The best interpre-
tation, however, is not necessarily the "correct" interpretation. In
such situations, a persuasive argument by the agency charged with
enforcement of the statutory scheme should be entitled to some
weight. 36°
Second, agency expertise can and should influence deference.
Agency expertise often shapes the records produced to support
agency action. 36 ' The facts and the implications of particular policy
choices can and do influence a court's legal conclusion. To the extent
that an agency can conclude that a particular determination of law
is more likely to lead to a specific policy consequence, courts should
defer to that conclusion, assuming that the court agreed with the
agency as to the relevance of the specific policy consequence at
issue. 362
 Although no blanket rules suggest themselves, courts
should often defer to agencies, particularly when the issue is one
of some technical complexity. 363
Third, commentators have often observed that certain types of
legal determinations have little impact on other cases. 364 Often, this
distinction is phrased as the difference between law declaration and
law application. 365
 They view deference as appropriate in the latter
situation but not in the former. Despite problems of definition, there
"0
 This approach raises the question of what is persuasive, In particular, should courts
endeavor to establish a spectrum of permissible conduct based on the presence (or absence)
of clear congressional intent and permit any agency action within the spectrum of permissible
conduct so created? If courts adopted a delegation theory, it should not matter how an agency
supported its action as long as the action is supportable. When reviewing legislation, for
example, courts do not attempt to ascertain the motive behind legislative action, but only
whether the action taken is within an enumerated power and whether a rational basis for
the legislation could be ascribed to the legislature. See United States v, Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938). Courts have long held, however, that an agency decision
must find adequate support in the record, even if a question of law is at stake. In some cases,
for example, the Supreme Court has upheld an agency action earlier held by the Court to
be unsupportable. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). The difference was not the action taken or the legislative scheme
under which the action was taken, but the rationale for the agency's action. In short, the
agency must explain itself, and the Court must be persuaded by the agency's explanation.
36 ' See Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 51-59 (1975).
16s Following Chevron, at least one court has concluded, however, that Chevron deference
is applicable even if the agency's decisions are not based on its expertise. See National Fuel
Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 1570 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869 (1987).
30' See Diver, supra note 19, at 592-93.
964
 See, e.g., Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities:
An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. 12Ev. 681, 723-24 (1984).
969 See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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is some appeal in a distinction along these lines. Functionally, courts
should view deference differently, depending on whether the legal
determination would have an impact on many or a few regulated
actors.
For example, courts sometimes reconcile the Hearst and Packard
cases on this basis. 366 In both cases, the issue was essentially the
same, namely, what is an "employee" for purposes of the NLRA.
The key difference between the cases is that the answer in Hearst
would only affect the status of newsboys whereas the answer in
Packard would affect all supervisory personnel.
Similarly, courts would defer to an agency determination in-
volving the specific application of an already articulated standard,
much the same way that certain issues involving application of a
legal standard are given to a jury, rather than a judge, to decide. 367
Courts may defer to such determinations because they do not have
ramifications for regulated parties other than those specifically acted
upon. The legal standard for the regulated group, as a whole, is
the standard already articulated, and, presumably, would be subject
to independent judicial review.
Lastly, the manner in which Congress grants power to an
agency should affect the amount of deference a court gives to that
agency's actions. The amount of judical deference, however, should
not be based on the notion that the delegation reflects congressional
intent to permit the agency to determine policy. 368 The congres-
sional intent argument fails because Congress may not restrict the
courts' power to interpret law. 369 Further, no basis usually exists to
conclude that Congress had this intent when it delegated a matter
to the agency. The fact that an explicit delegation has occurred does
mean, however, that congressional intent is probably ambiguous
with respect to the matter delegated. An agency's action pursuant
to an express delegation of authority, utilizing its expertise reason-
ably, is entitled to persuasive deference, and, given the probable
lack of a definitive expression of congressional intent, is more likely
to be found persuasive. On the other hand, when the agency acts
366 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
367 For example, a jury ordinarily determines whether the elements of a cause of action
are satisfied. This determination might entail the application of legal concepts, such as
proximate cause in negligence law, to a specific factual situation. It is a mixture of factual
and legal determinations. See Byte, supra note 22, at 335-36; Judicial Review, supra note 22,
at 368 (comment by Cass Sunstein).
868 See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 22, at 31-35.
768 See supra notes 177-301 and accompanying text.
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pursuant to general authority, as, for example, with interpretative
regulations, courts would generally accord less persuasive weight to
the agency's interpretation. Nonetheless, courts should not ignore
a reasoned interpretation, based upon agency expertise, merely
because the agency's action was not pursuant to an express dele-
gation. 7°
C. Objections to the Interbranch Cooperation Model
At this point, I anticipate some objections to my views. On the
one hand, commentators might be concerned that I have adopted
a judicial supremacy model. That is, although I give lip service to
deference, my deference has no teeth; courts only defer to agency
interpretations with which they agree. Moreover, other commen-
tators might claim that I have committed the cardinal sin of modern
jurisprudence: I have resurrected Lochner3" with respect to judicial
review of agency action. On the other hand, others might think that
I have merely regarbed Chevron deference in clothes more to my
liking. Under my view, courts would continue to defer to agency
action. Would this deference not run contrary to the command of
Marbuiy? I turn now to these objections.
"° Similarly, agency interpretations made less formally—litigation positions, for exam-
ple—should be examined by courts, but only for their persuasive weight. Such agency
positions are not appropriate candidates for Chevron deference, however. See Anthony, supra
note 22, at 55-63, But see Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(en banc) ("To suggest . . . that the . (counsels' position] is not an 'agency position' is to
imply that IRS counsel are mavericks, disembodied from the agency that they represent.")
(Silberman, J., concurring) (emphasis in original), aff'd, 484 U.S. 9 (1987). Although such
agency interpretations did not have to withstand the rigor of notice and comment procedures
or even the scrutiny of internal agency procedures before being announced, there is no
reason for a court not to consider them. It does make sense, however, to give less deference
to a position that has not withstood the scrutiny of public notice and comment or even the
full range of internal agency policy-making procedures.
Courts and commentators are currently divided post-Chevron as to how much deference
interpretive regulations are owed. See, e.g., Doe v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d 1441, 1446 (7th Cir.
1987) (interpretive regulations accorded less deference), amended, 842 F.2d 194 (7th Cir.
1988); Anthony, supra note 22, at 42-43, 55-63 (interpretive rules and less formal agency
action do not bind the courts); Knight & Knight, A New Approach to Judicial Review of
Interpretive Regs, J. TAx'N 326, 326-31 (Nov. 1986) (courts do give deference to IRS interpre-
tive regulations); Saunders, Interpretive Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal
for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 357 (Chevron eliminates the distinction between
legislative and interpretive rules).
" I Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner stands for, among other things,
the Court impermissibly interjecting its view of sound policy to invalidate the legislative acts
of majoritarian bodies. See generally Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLum. L. REV. 873 (1987).
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1. Does Prudential Deference Have any Teeth?
One objection to the prudential deference model that this ar-
ticle suggests is that it lacks teeth; that is, courts "defer" only to
agency interpretations with which they agree. This objection merely
restates the fallacy implicit in Chevron—that statutes are clear or
they are not. Once we accept that statutes arc ambiguous, but that
some plausible interpretations are "better" than others, prudential
deference can have the effect of favoring an agency's plausible
interpretation of the statute. Thus, the agency's view is likely to be
decisive in many cases.
In addition, this objection loses sight of the fact that, despite
the court's active role in reviewing questions of law, the agency still
exercises considerable control over regulatory policy by setting its
regulatory agenda and by controlling the record employed in re-
viewing agency action. True enforcement policy—deciding what
aspects of a regulatory scheme to emphasize and when—remains
largely immune to judicial review. 372 Even when agency action is
reviewable, the scope of remedy is restricted. The agency controls
what gets done; the court's role is only to assure that what is done
comports with congressional intent.
Even if the court plays the predominant role in making legal
determinations, because of the deferential role played in reviewing
the agency's factual determinations 373 and because of the limited
ability of courts to influence the record produced by the agency, 374
the agency is in a position to control the outcome of many decisions.
This article does not suggest that agencies may alter the record;
such transgressions would justify enhanced judicial scrutiny. This
article suggests, however, that agencies take many, if not most, of
their actions on the basis of an assessment of facts, arid that, in the
factual sphere, the court's role is limited.
2. Is Independent Review a Return to Lochner?
Another objection to the prudential deference model is that by
having courts determine legal questions, rather than deferring to
reasonable agency interpretations, independent review replicates
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985).
sr"
	
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (1988).
3" See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519, 523-25 (1978) (courts may not impose procedural requirements not required
by congressional act or the Constitution).
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the same evil committed by the Lochner Court. In 1905, in Lochner
v. New York, the Supreme Court struck down a statute regulating
the hours of bakery workers as a violation of the due process and
contract clauses. 375 Today, Lochner is a symbol of the idea that courts
ought not second-guess the wisdom of policy decisions made by
legislative bodies. 376
To some extent, the validity of the objection depends on
whether a significant difference exists between actions by legislative
and administrative bodies. If there is no significant difference, the
Lochner objection is compelling. As discussed earlier, however, the
argument that decisions made by administrative parties are on par
with those made by legislative bodies is weak. 377
 At best, those who
argue this position mean that agencies are more like legislatures
than courts are. They do not seriously argue for agency parity with
legislatures.378 Even the claim for agency superiority to judicial
bodies is premised on the assumption that agencies are more re-
sponsive to majoritarian concerns than courts and that majoritari-
anism is a value implicated in the court/agency context. Each of
these assumptions is open to serious question.
To the extent that the judicial review issue revolves around
congressional intent, invalidating administrative action that does not
comport with the best understanding of congressional intent rep-
resents legislative, not judicial, superiority. Courts are imposing Con-
gress's policy views on agencies, not their own policy views. Such
imposition does not run afoul of Lochner. Indeed, independent
review can be seen as consistent with majoritarianism, as it seeks to
preserve legislative superiority over the executive branch on matters
of policy.
Moreover, to the extent that the problem with Lochner dealt
with deference to fact-finding by majoritarian bodies, 379 indepen-
dent review of agency interpretations of law does not replicate the
evils of Lochner. Under my approach, courts accept administrative
facts if they are not arbitrary or are supported by substantial evi-
dence.'t 8o
"5 198 U.S. 95, 64 (1905).
"6 See Sunstein, supra note 371, at 882-83.
"' See supra notes 284-91,302-14 and accompanying text.
57" But see Mashaw, supra note 314, at 91.
371 The Lochner Court, fur example, appeared to be sympathetic to the idea that the
legislation was needed to produce wholesome bread, but found that the facts did not support
the rationale. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62.
w Some courts might argue, however, that the hard-look doctrine, see Motor Vehicle
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To the extent that the evil of Lochner was a disagreement as to
the permissible exercises of governmental power, however, some
parallel exists between Lochner and independent review. In both
situations, the courts are telling another branch of government that
its actions cannot be permitted. This aspect of Lochner retains vitality
today,38 ' however, and, even if this aspect of Lochner were also
discredited, there are crucial distinctions between the two situations.
Surely, we do not wish to abandon the idea that, at least as to matters
involving constitutionality, it is the duty of the Court to say what
the law is. The problem with Lochner was not its posture of review,
but the content of its constitutional theory. 382
In the administrative review situation, moreover, the conse-
quences of erroneous court decisions are far less severe. After Loch-
ner, all New York could do was attempt to amend the Constitution
or to wait for the Court's composition to change. 383 Because inde-
pendent review of questions of law retains the principle of legislative
supremacy, Congress can correct erroneous interpretations of law.
One further difference remains between administrative and
legislative action that bears on Lochner. Since the renunciation of
Lochner, commentators have wrestled with an apparent inconsis-
tency in the law. Although modern courts do not subject many
legislative actions to Lochner-like scrutiny, in some situations the
courts do engage in heightened scrutiny of legislative action. 384
Mfg. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-44 (1983), does result
in a Lochner-like effect in that the court must be satisfied with the thoroughness of the
agency's analysis. This doctrine is a type of scrutiny that admittedly, goes beyond what we
now require of legislative bodies. This scrutiny seems appropriate, however, given the agen-
cy's inferior status to legislatures, so long as the court only ensures that the agency rationally
considers all issues and that the remedy for inadequately considered decisions is a remand
to the agency. If this is done, the courts do not substitute their judgments for those of the
agency, but they do ensure that agency action is rational.
38 See Sunstein, supra note 371, at 882.
582 See id.
585 See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). In West Coast Hotel, Justice
Roberts, in siding with the majority, has been credited with a "switch in time" that saved the
Supreme Court from being expanded in size under President Roosevelt's "Court Packing
Plan." See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 130 n.2 (11th ed. 1985). Whether this
result is true, between 1937 and 1941, President Roosevelt was able to make seven Court
appointments, producing a Court more receptive to Roosevelt's theory of government. Cf.
Garcia v, San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the
fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a
majority of this Court.").
say
	
Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
& n.4 (1938), contains the classic declaration of this dichotomy.
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Some courts have explained this dichotomy in terms of majoritari-
anism.385 Under this view, courts should not overturn the determi-
nations made by majoritarian bodies unless the legislation affects
values that are anti-majoritarian in nature, 388 reduces the effective-
ness of the legislative process 3" or disparately affects the interests
of discrete and insular minorities. 388 Others have explained the
dichotomy as a result of comparative competence. 389 Under that
view, the courts have decided that it would be an improper intrusion
on legislative perrogatives to second-guess legislation, unless there
is an affirmative mandate to review the legislation. Such affirmative
mandates are provided by specific constitutional provisions. 3" Gen-
eral scrutiny of legislation under due process or equal protection
grounds, however, would not be allowed.
Under either of these rationales, the evils of Lochner are not
implicated when a court reviews an agency determination. Unless
one views agencies as majoritarian bodies,39 ' one non-majoritarian
body—a court—is reviewing the determination of another non-
majoritarian body—the agency. Even if one assumes that agencies
are majoritarian bodies, however, courts are reviewing agency action
not to vindicate their own view of wise government policy, but to
vindicate congressional policy. To seek to vindicate congressional
supremacy in matters of governmental policy is not to commit the
sins of Lochner, but to learn the lessons gained from the rejection
of Lochnerian jurisprudence.
3. Is Prudential Deference Different from Chevron Deference?
Some commentators might argue that, after showing that courts
must independently review administrative interpretations of law,
this article retreats and, following Chevron, allows courts to defer to
agency action. Two differences in approach make the prudential
deference model defensible in a way that Chevron is not. First,
585 See, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 303.
588 E.g., the religion clauses of the first amendment.
587 E.g., the free speech and association clauses of the first amendment.
588 E.g., the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as applied to racial
and ethnic minorities.
999
 See Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 417, 424—
26 (1981); Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1212,1213-20 (1978).
'"° Thus, courts can review legislative enactments to determine if they violate specific
prohibitions in the Constitution, such as the first and fourth amendments.
'9 ' See supra notes 302-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of this argument.
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prudential deference is triggered by a variety of factors and does
not represent a blanket rule. Further, it involves persuasive, not
binding, deference. Thus, courts are ultimately available to provide
independent review and, in fact, would often engage in indepen-
dent review. In the interests of accuracy, efficiency and interbranch
cooperation, however, they share this power.with the agency when
it is appropriate to do so.
Second, this model is a court-made restriction on judicial review.
It is one thing for the legislative branch to place restrictions on the
judicial branch. Such restrictions raise questions of separation of
powers. It is another thing for the judicial branch to engage in
judicial restraint. 392
 When the courts selectively choose to defer,
they retain the power to engage in independent review, maintaining
the requisite control over all agency determinations of law.
4. Is the Approach Manageable?
Given the multi-factored approach suggested, one might raise
a concern about manageability—is the approach clear enough so
that courts can apply it without error? If not, the Supreme Court
must either review the lower court decisions to correct them or
allow erroneous lower court decisions to stand. Neither situation is
attractive.
The suggested approach would not be entirely error-free. In-
deed, the case-by-case nature of the approach invites inconsistency.
The Chevron approach, however, has not proven to be a clear test. 393
Although Chevron presents a simple-to-describe test, it has not been
easy to apply, and, although Chevron presents a uniform test, it has
not produced uniform results. Thus, a better question might be
which approach would be more manageable. Although the answer
to this question is not obvious, it should not be decisive in selecting
among theories of judicial review.
A related concern involves the agency, Congress and regulated
actors. As Justice Scalia suggests, Chevron could be seen as a default
rule that Congress could change.394
 This alternative approach, de-
pending as it does on specific factors in each case, is harder to
predict. Whatever functional merit Chevron might have as a rule of
3u2 See Amar, supra note 205, at 267 (decision by court not to exercise power to review
a case is different than the court being precluded from reviewing the case); Currie, Bankruptcy
Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON L. REY. 441, 458 (1983) (same).
5" See supra notes 100-49 and accompanying text.
"4 See supra notes 335-39 and accompanying text.
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statutory interpretation, it is still subject to constitutional scrutiny;
and if the default rule is an impermissible one, it matters little
whether it is easy to identify. Prudential deference is the only type
of deferential method of review that is also constitutional. Any
manageability problems inherent in the prudential approach are
present because they directly or indirectly serve constitutional ends.
The interbranch cooperation model is, like all models of judicial
review of agency action, subject to criticism on a number of levels.
Because the problem cuts to the heart of separation of powers, the
solution proposed in this article represents an attempt to balance
competing concerns that urge in favor of different branches of the
federal government. The article has tried to justify its model in
separation of powers terms and to argue that it strikes the proper
balance. Although the model does not have the ease of administra-
tion of a blanket rule, Chevron has not produced an easily admin-
istered rule either. In light of the alternatives, the article has argued
that the interbranch cooperation model represents the best model
for judicial review of agency action.
I V. CONCLUSION
In some ways, one can easily understand why some judges and
commentators have embraced Chevron. Chevron appeared to replace
an admittedly messy area of the law with a unitary test. Its rationale
also appealed to those who take the view that courts should restrict
their role to "applying" rather than "making" the law. It is equally
clear why Chevron was decried by other judges and commentators.
Chevron restricts the ability of the judiciary to interpret the law.
Opponents of Chevron viewed it as usurping the traditional role of
the judicial branch.
This article has critically examined these claims and concluded
that, by restricting judicial review over agency action, Chevron un-
constitutionally shifts the balance of powers among the branches of
government. Administrative agencies exist in the context of a num-
ber of checks on their power. The legitimacy of their wielding of
legislative and judicial power depends upon an active judicial role
in checking their power. As for the exercise of "pure" executive
power, judicial review is needed as well in order to ensure the due
process rights of affected parties.
Even if restricting judicial review per Chevron were constitu-
tional, it would not represent an attractive political theory. The
claim that Chevron serves to ensure that politically accountable
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branches make legal determinations fails on factual and theoretical
bases. Moreover, a competing concern, that of agency bias, affir-
matively argues for active judicial review.
As the post-Chevron experience shows, the ease of application
promised by Chevron has proven elusive. The Chevron approach has
raised as many issues as it has clarified, and has merely reshifted
the existing battle to a different battlefield. It is time to reject the
strong reading of Chevron.
Although this article squarely rejects Chevron, it does not ad-
vocate that courts always engage in an independent review of the
legal determinations made by agencies. It advocates a return to the
pre-Chevron tradition of courts deciding, as a prudential matter, to
defer to agency determinations on a case-by-case basis. This type of
deference need be neither arbitrary nor toothless. Although such
deference generates some uncertainty as to when courts will defer
to an agency's interpretation, this uncertainty is, in fact, a positive
feature of the approach because it provides incentives for agencies
to act reasonably. 595 It also gives courts needed flexibility to allow
agencies to adapt to change and to curb agency excesses. Unlike
Chevron, prudential deference accommodates the realities of the
modern administrative state without eviscerating the notions of sep-
aration of powers and checks and balances on which our govern-
ment is based.
995 See Byse, supra note 22, at 266-67; Mikva, Now Should the Courts Treat Administrative
Agencies?, 36 AM. U.L. REV. I, 8-9 (1986).
